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This study is a single case study of the evolution on the Spanish immigration policy 
field. The research question of the study is divided into two main focuses, one 
empirical and one theoretical. The first is what are the changes in the Spanish 
immigration policy and in the administrative organization of the policy field since 
1985 up until today? The second, more theoretically oriented research question is how 
well do the three perspectives from organizational theory account for these changes? 
 By using the different perspectives of organizational theory, it is argued that it 
has been possible to reach a comprehensive understanding of the Spanish immigration 
policy field. The instrumental perspective focuses on the changes of formal structures 
and regulations. The cultural perspective has shown that the institutional context of the 
Spanish economy has severely limited the options open to politicians on the field. 
Finally, the myth perspective has been able to reveal disparities between symbolic 
statements by Spanish political actors and the actions that they have pursued in 
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1.1 A Perilous Journey 
In 2006, European mass media were flush with reports about the increasing waves of 
irregular immigrants to the Spanish Canary Islands. The immigrants were arriving in 
small African fishing boats, converted to bringing as much as seventy immigrants in 
each load, from as far as Mauritania (El País). Spanish politicians were alarmed, and 
obviously felt that they had to take measures in order to prove that they were on top of 
the situation (Ospina 2008:351). Through the many reports of interceptions at sea and 
drowning immigrants, it appeared that irregular boat immigrants from North and Sub-
Saharan Africa were virtually flooding the Canary Islands, as well as the south of the 
Spanish mainland. The numbers of irregular immigrants in Spain had grown 
exponentially over the last decade. But if media may give the impression that the most 
common way of arriving illegally in Spain is by boat, only a very small percentage of 
Spain´s total number of immigrants do so (Cachón and Laparra 2009:28). Even though 
until at least 2006 the majority of immigrants in Spain were irregular, in nearly all 
cases they became irregulars through much less dramatic procedures, most commonly 
through overstaying their visa. In addition, the arrivals of boat immigrants have 
decreased significantly since the dramatic peaks of 2006 (Rubalcaba 2009 [Press 
conference]). Nevertheless, because of Spain´s recent history, Spain´s geographic 
position which makes it the south-western gatekeeper of the European Union and the 
relative importance of irregularity, there are aspects in Spanish immigration policy that 
makes it a very interesting research topic.  
By immigration policy, I exclusively refer to the formal rules and their 
implementation concerning entering, permanence and work permits for people other 
than Spanish nationals. Thus, I will not analyze Spanish policy concerning the 
integration of immigrants in Spanish society in order to delimit the scope of the thesis. 
Consequently, the thesis is devoted to the measures taken to obtain an orderly 
management of immigration flows. This seems logical when the object of study is 
apparently characterized by a system of immigration based on irregularity. As EU 
2 
 
regulations have meant that communitarian citizens have roughly the same right to 
work and live in Spain as Spanish nationals, I will also only discuss the evolution of 
Spanish immigration policy when it comes to third country nationals, i.e. citizens from 
outside the European Union or the European Economic Area. This is illustrated by that 
Romanians represented a very important group of the irregular immigrants living and 
working in Spain before 2007, the year Romania entered the European Union (Saliba 
2010 [Telephone interview]).  But as they from this year did not need permits for 
working and living in Spain anymore, the result was that the number of irregular 
immigrants in the country decreased substantially.    
1.2 Research Question 
My research question will be divided into two parts: Firstly, what are the changes in 
the Spanish immigration policy and in the administrative organization of the policy 
field since 1985 up until today? In this part, the answer will largely consist of 
revealing the major evolutions when it comes to the overarching strategies that have 
been implemented on the policy field. Key concepts such as specialization principles 
and political control will in addition indicate the kinds of approaches that have been 
applied to the policy field during the period. The second part of the research question 
is how well do the three perspectives from organizational theory account for these 
changes? Here, I will explicitly interpret the main findings with the theoretical 
approaches from organizational theory. Expectedly, not any one of the perspectives 
will be able to analyze every aspect of the evolutions. If it were so there would be no 
reason to use three perspectives. Instead, the perspectives will be applied as lenses that 
help to focus on different aspects. The ambition is to achieve a comprehensive 
explanation of the empirical findings. In this way, the choice of research question has 
led to a theory interpreting case study research design. 
1.3 Theoretical Approaches 
I will analyze the Spanish immigration policy by employing various theoretical 
insights from several contributions of the three different perspectives from 
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organizational theory: the instrumental perspective, the cultural perspective and the 
myth perspective. I have decided to use these insights because they provide very useful 
lenses when one studies public policy, as it is possible to discern different relevant 
aspects, both formal and informal, of institutions and policy fields. By using three 
different perspectives it is possible to learn more about the object of study than 
through just one single point of view (Scott 2003:30). The theoretical justification for 
employing the perspectives on an entire policy field is that policy fields, in the same 
way as institutions, assign normatively backed rights and responsibilities to actors and 
provide for their “public” enforcement (Streeck and Thelen 2005:17). The perspectives 
have for example been used to study reforms and the effects of reforms in Norwegian 
immigration policy (Christensen et al 2006). 
The first one of the theoretical perspectives is the instrumental perspective, 
which emphasizes that public organizations are first and foremost tools which rational 
policy-makers use to reach certain goals (Christensen et al 2004:30). The way that the 
organizational structure is made is expected to determine the activities of its members. 
Through directing the organizational actors towards certain procedures and goals, a 
carefully designed structure will make politicians able to reach their goals. 
Accordingly, in immigration policy, it would be assumed that politicians, who have 
relevant knowledge of their country´s need for labor, establish public agencies that 
efficiently process applications for visas and work permits. Further, the governing 
politicians will decide the horizontal and vertical linkages of the agencies concerned 
with immigration issues in the most rational way (Christensen et al 2004:35-36). Still, 
if the instrumental perspective was to depict a precise picture of actual public policy, it 
would be possible to explain any malfunction with incorrect organizational structure.  
However, as the cultural perspective suggests, it might not be that simple. Not 
only formal structures count, but also the actual ability to exercise what the formal 
structure prescribes. A culture of informal economy will be very difficult to discover if 
one only studies the laws of a country. In the cultural perspective, leaders of 
institutions and politicians are not seen as acting proactively by adapting structures as 
means to obtaining predefined goals. It is instead considered that goals are discovered 
along the way and informal identities, values and norms are developed within the 
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institution over time (Selznick 1997:41).On one hand, this makes the actors within the 
organization identify themselves with the organization, which makes it robust and 
more apt in solving its tasks. The more an organization or a policy field posses these 
traits, the more they are considered institutions; they become institutionalized. As 
fulfilling their tasks as members of the institution will be a form of fulfilling their own 
life projects, it is expected that they have a considerable desire for making the 
institution work properly. On the other hand, when organizations become 
institutionalized and come to be regarded as goals of their own, it will in the next turn 
become all the more difficult to change their goals and methods. This may pose a 
problem for policy makers who wish to adapt public organizations to changing 
challenges in society. I will explore both a conventional and an alternative view on the 
roles of informal versus formal rules in the cultural perspective, and on how different 
approaches of the cultural perspective regard the possibilities for institutional change. 
The last aspect is important because it might provide insights for analyzing the 
dynamics between the Spanish immigration policy and the institutionalized 
immigration context. The first is important because one may suspect that certain 
informal rules and values persist and even overshadow the formal ones on the policy 
field. The relative importance of the Spanish informal sector might be so big that in 
practice, formal rules on immigration and contracting immigrants are ignored.  
This brings us to the myth perspective, which is based on the assertion that 
public institutions, as well as other organizations, exist in an institutionalized 
environment (Christensen et al 2004:66). The institutionalized environment confronts 
the organizations with demands of what is to be regarded as proper ways of formal 
organizational structure. Organizations can therefore not base their existence entirely 
on technical efficiency, but must also legitimate themselves by conforming to the 
institutional environment. However, as the classical myth perspective approach argues, 
that new formal structures are imposed in a policy field, or on other institutions does 
not mean that they will be reflected in the behavior of the members of these entities. 
To deduce from a formal ratification of the ‘zero immigration’ principle that 
immigration does not occur is seriously misguided, if in reality it only leads to a 
growing irregular immigration. The decoupling of structure and content makes it easier 
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for members to maintain their modes of action. But as formal structure is generally 
highly regarded in modern society, it is also a golden opportunity for leaders and 
policy makers to symbolically signalize their action capabilities to the institutional 
environment. In a domain as the immigration policy field, the complex reality on the 
ground might provoke politicians to take such symbolic steps. In the virus theory 
though, which is the alternative elaboration of the myth perspective, it is argued that 
over time it will be very difficult to keep the formal structure and actions apart. This is 
because the formal structure will be translated more and more into actual practice 
(Røvik 2007:350).  
1.4 Case Study Research Design 
As all case studies necessarily are cases of a larger family of comparable phenomena, 
it is useful to indicate what kind of theoretical universe the study is supposed to be a 
case of (Andersen 2005:61). I will explicitly place the Spanish immigration policy 
within a European context, and also in comparison to other Southern European 
countries, and I will demonstrate how the Spanish case distinguishes itself. The case 
study design allows one to thoroughly explore a delimited theme and discover causal 
mechanisms that can be difficult to discover with more quantitative oriented studies. 
As the immigration policy field is expected to be of a complex nature, with important 
details that at first glance may seem insignificant, I argue that the single case study 
design is appropriate for my thesis. However, the case study design also poses 
methodical dilemmas, the most notable being how it is possible to generalize from a 
single case study to the theoretical universe (Gerring 2004:348). This problem as well 
as the more virtuous aspects of the case study design will be thoroughly discussed in 
the method chapter.  
Accordingly, data gathering in such a qualitative study will not be limited to 
only one type of source. Official documents, juridical commentaries, secondary 
literature and interviews are being used to obtain a rich description that has potential to 
reveal the essence in regard to the object of study and making the complexity 
understandable. The method of telephone interviewing is used in some of the 
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interviews instead of interviews in person. Qualitative telephone interviewing has 
received little attention in the general method literature, in opposition to quantitative 
telephone surveys (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:107). But it will be argued that 
telephone interviewing does not pose serious problems for the data gathering in this 
study.  
1.5 Immigration Policy in Spain: Why Is It 
Interesting? 
When it comes to the phenomenon of migration, Spain was earlier first and foremost a 
country of emigrants. In fact it still is, as over 1.5 million people of Spanish nationality 
are living abroad today (INE 2010). As Spain was an underdeveloped country, 
compared to its European neighbors to the north, it was understandably not a very 
attractive country to emigrate to. In the last couple of decades however, the country 
has experienced formidable transformations, both in political and economical terms. 
First, I will argue why Spain´s immigration policy is an interesting study object. This 
is grounded on the particularities of Spain´s recent history, economic development, 
and also on its particular geographic position on Europe´s south-western border. 
Spain is today a fully integrated Member Country of the EU, but when it comes 
to the democratic development during the past 50 years the country has a far more 
dramatic history than the majority of other Western European countries. Even if the 
democratic transition restarted at the death of Generalissimo Franco in 1975, it took 
more than 10 years until democracy was consolidated in Spain. The turbulence of the 
transition from the Francoist regime had its dramatic climax in the last failed military 
coup attempt in Western Europe as late as in February 1981 (Colomer 1991:1294).  
At the economic level, Spain has experienced several periods of both boom and 
crisis, but overall the development have been prosperous, with Spain ranking as the 4th 
largest economy in the Euro-zone in 2008 (CIA). The economic development is also 
important to understand the complete turn-around in the Spanish migration patterns. 
Earlier, when Spain was lagging behind in both democratic and economic terms, the 
country was mainly a provider of emigrants as cheap labor to the richer Western 
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European countries, especially during the 1950s (Casey 2010 [Telephone interview]). 
Some very few relatively developed regions in Spain such as Catalonia also 
experienced internal migration of poor Spaniards, from for instance the rural regions 
Extremadura and Andalucía. At the dawn of European mass tourism in the 1960s, 
Spain slowly started its recovery from the economic underdevelopment as the 
economic isolation policy was abandoned (Fugelstad 2004:209).  Since the oil crisis in 
1973, and later the economic take-off in Spain from the 1980s and onwards, most of 
Spain´s emigrants have returned to a country in demand of labor. Spain became a net 
importer of labor in the 1980s, and the number of immigrants in the country has risen 
from the total of 182 045 in 1980 to 1 572 017 in 2002 (Moreno 2004:9). The 
integration of Spain into the EEC/EU, the economic transformation and the political 
transition are three somewhat interconnected processes that have substantially shifted 
Spain´s position in the international migration system (Moreno 2004:1). This new 
pattern of migration makes the Spanish immigration management policy a particularly 
interesting object of study, as policy makers were faced with a phenomenon that they 
had not experienced earlier. 
This thesis is to be seen as a small contribution to the research already 
conducted on Spanish immigration policy. Amongst the contributions  which are 
written in English are Geddes´ (2003)  book on the politics of immigration in Europe 
in general, which includes a central view that suggests a particular model of persisting 
irregular immigration in Spain, as well as in other Southern European countries 
(Geddes 2003: 171). Kitty Calavita (1998, 2003) has also conducted studies with a 
legalistic focus on Spain´s immigration policy, where the troubles of Spanish 
bureaucracy are emphasized (for example Calavita 1998: 548). In Spanish, Zapatero-
Barrero´s (ed 2009) book concerning the challenges of public policy in relation to the 
immigration policy field should be mentioned. There are also other studies of the 
theme in the political geography field, which mainly focus on Spain´s delicate 
geographic position. These studies focus on Spain´s land border with Africa (from the 
Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla) and the maritime border in the Gibraltar Strait, 
have been conducted by for example Ferrer-Gallardo (2008). In Spain, there have been 
done various sociological studies on the country´s immigration policy, in particular 
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from the labor market perspective (Cachón 2002, Cachón 2009 and Cachón and 
Laparra 2009).  I have not been able to find political science studies concerning 
Spanish immigration policy employing organizational theory. Therefore, as I will 
explicitly study Spain in the EU context, my ambition is to provide a thesis that 
contributes to the ongoing research and debate on immigration policy in Europe. 
1.6 The Main Evolutions of Spanish Immigration 
Policy from 1985 onwards 
Before 1985, Spain did not have an immigration law, and as indicated the number of 
immigrants in the country was very low. As late as in 1986, there were only 30 000 
immigrants living in Catalonia, which is the region that has received most immigration 
in Spain (Saliba 2010 [Telephone interview]). The late formalization of the Spanish 
immigration law is one of the main reasons of the time scope limitation in this thesis. 
The other main reason is that the numbers of immigrants started to grow significantly 
not much later than this year. Spain was to join the European Economic Community 
(the predecessor of the European Union) in 1986. As a consequence, the country had 
to put in place norms on the immigration field that were somewhat comparable to the 
laws in other European countries. It is therefore considered by some that the first 
immigration law in Spain was more a result of the accommodation to communitarian 
norms, than from attempting to regulate an existing problem (Ospina 2008:312).  
The current immigrant regulations in Spain divide sharply between irregular 
and regular immigrants (Cachón 2009:166). What is often the result for irregular 
immigrants is that they can only obtain employment in the underground economy.  
When Spain passed its first immigration law, the explicit intent was both to 
evade irregular immigration, and at the same time to guarantee the rights of foreigners 
in Spain. One of its results though, was that more than 90 000 immigrants from 
countries from outside the EEC, or a small number of countries with whom Spain at 
the time had special agreements for, became illegal overnight (Calavita 1998:544). A 
main principle in Spain´s policy since this first immigration law has been to adapt the 
numbers permitted to enter Spain legally to the “national situation of employment” 
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(Cachón 2009:177, author´s translation). This means that the various Spanish 
governments ideally would want immigrants who reflect in numbers and 
characteristics the needs of the Spanish labor market. However, more often than not, 
this has meant that immigrants have been excluded from the formal Spanish labor 
market.  
From the late eighties, the immigration numbers in Spain picked up pace, and 
especially North African immigrants came to be an important group amongst 
immigrants in Spain, as well as Latin Americans. In the early 2000s the number of 
irregular immigrants in Spain had grown from nearly insignificant quantities to an 
estimated 1.5 million (Moreno 2004:9).  
A closely linked phenomenon to the persisting irregularity in Spain has been the 
various regularization processes, which have meant that irregular immigrants have 
gotten their statuses formalized. For example, the last process in 2005, led to the 
regularization of nearly 600 000 people. In economic terms, the process led to 
significant higher revenues for the Spanish state as hundreds of thousands of irregular 
immigrants consequently became tax-payers (Pabón López 2007:31). However, 
questions have been raised whether these processes induce further illegal immigration 
in the long run. This concern is due to that would be irregular immigrants might expect 
that they will achieve a formalized status within a tolerable amount of time (Cachón 
2002:113). Even if the “national situation of employment” principle represents the 
outspoken ideal for Spanish policy makers of varying party affiliations, they seem 
incapable of providing regulations that are adapted to the demands of Spanish labor 
market. The economic take-off in Spain has produced up until the current economic 
crisis vast demands for unskilled labor in particularly the service and construction 
sectors (Cachón 2002: 120-121). Combined with the possibility for finding informal 
work, this has led to that the most normal way of immigration became the irregular 
one.  
Attempts to put an end to the virtual inexistence of means of entering Spain 
legally were started in 1993, when an annual quota system for foreign workers was 
created. The problem of this solution was that people being hired through the quotas 
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were foreign persons already living (illegally) in Spain, so it was in no way a credible 
dissuasion to irregular immigration.  
Two reforms of the immigration law were seen through in the Spanish 
parliament in the year 2000. The first one was a result of extensive compromise 
between the rightist minority government of the PP and the opposition, as well as other 
political actors, such as the unions (Ospina 2008:322). The original outcome was an 
extension of foreigners´ rights, and even irregular immigrants gained legal access to 
health services and the right to unionize. However, these rights were revoked in the 
second immigration reform law the same year, as the PP gained the absolute majority 
after the general elections in 2000 and was able to push through for a reform that 
suited more their restrictive principle of ‘zero immigration’ (Saliba 2010 [Telephone 
interview]).  Eventually, the tougher immigration law did not seem to lead to a 
decrease in irregular immigration, as the sectors which resorted to immigrant labor are 
estimated to have continuously expanded between 2000 and 2004, particularly in the 
submerged economy. 
 When the socialist PSOE won the general elections in 2004, this originally led 
to a new official approach to Spanish immigration policy, as it turned towards 
acknowledgements of immigrants´ rights, a more active integration policy and more 
effective management of migration flows (Cachón 2009 [Interview]). Both unions and 
employers´ associations had come to regard the large numbers of irregular immigrants, 
working in a growing submerged economy, as a major problem (CES 2004:126). They 
then presented their concerns and propositions for solutions, which to a great extent 
served as the political philosophy that eventually led to the creation of the system for 
contracting workers in their countries of origin. However, a complementary aspect was 
insisted on when the system was implemented. This included the requirement that the 
countries which were to provide the legal work immigrants had to accept repatriation 
treaties for irregular immigrants (Rumí 2004). Diverging views on the system for 
contracting labor in countries of origin remain. Some consider that at least the 
possibility for legal entry is a leap forward (Cachón 2009 [Interview]). Others, like the 
union Comisiones Obreras, consider that the system is not nearly agile enough (Saliba 
2010 [Telephone interview]). 
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 The boat immigrant crisis of 2006 resulted in an alarmist discourse by Spanish 
policy makers and contributed to a growing perception in the Spanish public of 
immigrants as a threat (Cachón and Laparra 2008:27). The boat immigrant crisis also 
coincided with the starting point of a changing political climate in the immigration 
debate in Spain. However, the economic crisis, into which Spain started to enter 
around 2005, is considered a more fundamental explication factor for this, as even the 
socialist PSOE is considered to have adopted a more anti-immigration discourse 
(Saliba 2010 [Telephone interview]). The more restrictive stance on immigration by 
the PSOE is also reflected in the latest reform in Spanish immigration policy in 
November 2009, which limits the possibilities for family reunification. 
1.7 The Structure of the Thesis   
In the second chapter of this thesis I will thoroughly explain the different approaches 
to the theoretical perspectives. I will show that the three perspectives offer different 
lenses for studying both formal and informal aspects of the Spanish immigration 
policy field. 
 I will explore both the stronger and the weaker sides of the chosen case study 
research design in the third chapter, which is dedicated to methodology. Here, I will 
also argue why the qualitative interview method is well suited for obtaining fulfilling 
data on Spanish immigration policy.  
 In the fourth chapter I will provide the detailed empirical account of the 
changes in Spanish immigration policy from 1985 to the end of 2009.  
 I will then employ the theoretical perspectives to analyze the main aspects of 
Spanish immigration policy and assess the changes which have taken place.   
In the sixth and final chapter, I will sum up the main findings and offer my 
conclusion. This will also include an evaluation of how well suited the theoretical 













2 The Perspectives of Organizational 
Theory 
2.1 The Instrumental Perspective 
2.1.1 The Essence of Structure 
In the instrumental perspective, the formal structure of organizations is emphasized, 
understood as a structure that is composed of positions and rules that tell how and by 
who the different organizational tasks are to be implemented (Christensen et al 
2004:31). Within the instrumental organizational theory perspective, the organization, 
which possesses highly formalized structures, is regarded as a tool for obtaining one or 
several goals (Scott 2003:26). For instance, a ministry is put in place to achieve some 
fundamental goals in society, like fighting unemployment. In the next turn, the formal 
structure is put in place in order to reach this goal. The structure defines the roles and 
tasks of for instance administrative leaders, financial controllers and clerks who have 
the regular contact with clients. The main virtue of the organization in this view is that 
it enables humans, who have limits to their rationality, to systemize their knowledge, 
needs and objectives in more completely rationalized organizations (Egeberg 
1984:27).   
Through specifying participants´ rights and obligations, the formal structure guides 
organizational behavior. This means that the expectations which meet organizational 
actors are only concerned with their formal position within the organization (Scott 
2003:35). In addition, the formal structure is made explicit in the rules and instructions 
that these actors are concerned with, for example which kind of actors that have access 
to certain decisions. Revealing the formal organization of the Spanish immigration 
policy field will therefore be essential for analyzing the empirical material with the 
instrumental perspective. Normally, the formal structure makes it clear how the tasks 
of the organization are supposed to be specialized and coordinated.  
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2.1.2 Principles of Specialization and Coordination 
Predictability and not randomness is what one expects from public organizations, and 
this is ensured by the bureaucratic organization. Moreover, the tasks that are 
specialized in the same public organizations are considered in relation to each other 
(Egeberg 1984:30-31). The main principles of horizontal specialization are the 
specialization by place, by purpose, by process or by clientele (Simon 1997:30). It can 
be argued that public immigration management organizations might be specialized 
based on any of these main principles. This is because they may be concerned with the 
management of national borders (by place). At the same time, they have a specific 
function of imposing national prerequisites for foreigners who enter and work on the 
national territory (by purpose) and is concerned with a particular group of people (by 
clientele). However, one main principle is in most cases chosen, and this has 
implications for public policy. This is the reason why determining the horizontal 
specialization principles at different stages of Spanish immigration history is 
important. In order to do this, it will be particularly interesting to observe which 
ministries that are concerned with immigration policy. The idea is that this might be 
telling in the choice of horizontal specialization principle.   
The vertical specialization refers to what kinds of tasks that are assigned to the 
different levels of the organizational hierarchy (Christensen et al 2004:34). The State 
Secretariat on Immigration and Emigration in the Spanish Department of Work for 
instance is responsible for developing immigration policy in general, while the Public 
Employment Service, which is situated on the operational level, is responsible for the 
practical handling of potential immigrants´ applications (Secretaría de Estado de 
Inmigración y Emigración; Servicio Público de Empleo). As organizations are seen as 
means to achieve goals, and as actual decision making is expected to be tightly linked 
with the formal structure, the information seeking and problem solving will mostly 
take place within the organizational borders (Egeberg 1984:35).  It is therefore 
expected that a merger of different organizational units will make it easier to balance 
and obtain a higher degree of coordination. This was for example the intention when 
the Spanish government in 2004 established the State Secretariat concerning all 
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matters that had to do with immigration (Rumí 2004). Empirical research has shown 
that whether a government service is organized within the departmental structure or on 
the outside of it has consequences for the policy outcomes (Egeberg 1984:66). If the 
organizational leadership of the government service is located within the departmental 
structure, it is expected that the political control will be tighter. The establishment of 
the Secretariat of Immigration within the Ministry of Labor in Spain in 2004 was an 
example of tight political control. The establishment of the Norwegian Directorate for 
Foreigners represented on the other hand the intention to separate day to day 
immigration management from politicians (Christensen et al. 2006: 70). The linkages 
between the different hierarchical levels in the Spanish immigration administration 
will in this way be studied since they might contribute in the explanation of policy 
outcomes.  
 The importance of the formal structure on actual behavior may diverge on the 
different levels of a hierarchical organization, which can be roughly divided into the 
leadership level, the administrative level and the operational level (Egeberg 1984:44). 
At the most specialized level, the operational one, objectives and expectations are 
relatively simple. The formal structure has a greater importance at this level, as formal 
roles are more specified. A clerk working in a government service, which is concerned 
with issuing work permits for immigrants, is an example of this limited scope of 
objectives: If an immigrant complies with the formal norms for obtaining it, the work 
permit is issued. At leadership level though, goals might be complex, ambiguous and 
contrasting, which means that formal roles are not as easily shaped at this level. The 
choices that a minister responsible for immigration makes are therefore not only 
contingent on formal structure, and more dependent on his personal convictions. 
 When it comes to organizational change according to the hierarchical variant of 
the instrumental perspective, this is another specialized function, as particular subunits 
have the tasks of organizational development (Egeberg 1984:47). There might be 
procedures that are made explicit in the formal normative structure of how 
organizational change is to be undertaken. In Fayol´s strict hierarchical model, the 
major coordination principles through which all participants are linked into a single 
pyramidal structure include the unity-of-command and the span-of-control (Scott 
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2003:41). The span-of-control means that for instance a manager of a national 
employment office should not have more subordinates than he or she can effectively 
supervise. In the coalition variant, the organizational development procedures are even 
more evident, as modern societies possess various conflict-reducing mechanisms as   
elections and bargaining between employers and unions.  
 The bigger an organization is, if one defines size as the number of 
organizational participants, the more the level of formalization will tend to be high 
(Egeberg 1984:57). Accordingly, it will be explored whether an increase in the volume 
of immigration to Spain has led to a greater formalization on the policy field. 
However, the instrumental implementing of organizational goals in accordance with 
the principles of purpose rationality does not mean that these goals themselves are not 
irrational or foolish (Scott 2003:33). For example, if one only seeks to delimit illegal 
boat immigration, it could be an efficient deterrent to follow up on the Italian extreme 
rightist politician Umberto Bossi´s request from 2003 to sink the immigrants’ boats 
with naval ships, even if that would be a morally unacceptable solution (Cavalera 
2003). No moral judgment will therefore be passed of organizational goals   when the 
Spanish immigration policy field is being analyzed with the instrumental perspective. 
What is in focus is how effective the policy that is being led is in attaining the goals 
that policy makers set.    
2.1.3 Organizational Goals   
The goals of organizations, understood as desired ends, vary in how specific or vague 
they are (Simon 1997:142). If the goals are specific, it is easier to understand what 
kind of measure should be employed to obtain them, than if the goals seem ambiguous 
or vague. However, even organizations which possess vague overarching goals, 
organization structure and policy are reflecting relatively specific goals. Purpose 
rational actions consist of four different phases: Deciding the goals of the organization, 
then finding out what alternative actions that are possible. The consequences of each 
alternative action must also be accounted for. The last phase consists of deciding the 
rules of how to decide amongst alternatives (Christensen et al 2004:32). Even if 
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organizational members possess limited knowledge and ability, and organizational 
goals are vague, these goals may serve to construct means-end chain with a hierarchy 
of goals (Scott 2003:51). In this way, specific formal procedures and rules are 
provided even if goals are vague. Following this logic, it will be analyzed how the 
overarching goals on the Spanish immigration policy field are divided into a series of 
more concrete subgoals. In practice, the expression of these subgoals will be studied in 
the arrangements of policy content and organization on the immigration policy field. 
The very formalization process, it is asserted in the instrumental perspective, 
has a number of consequences. It strongly favors the smooth functioning of the 
organization, independently of the feelings between its members (Scott 2003:37). In 
modern western societies, which possess many of the rational-legal features of 
Weber´s ideal type bureaucracy, the public administrative structures must be 
predictable both for superiors and subordinates (Scott 2003:47). This is in opposition 
to despotic states, like for example Spain during the Franco dictatorship, which 
remained a police state until its end (Fuglestad 2004:210). Contrastingly, in a rational-
legal system subordinates behave predictably through the specificity of their roles and 
obligations, while superiors are prevented from making arbitrary decisions. In 
addition, as they owe their allegiance to an impersonal organization, even lower 
administrative officials enjoy greater levels of professional autonomy. This means that 
they may question orders from superiors if these are not in accordance to the guiding 
principles.  
2.1.4 The Coalition Variant of the Instrumental Perspective 
The formal organizations that have been described above may give the impression that 
organizations represent the coming together of actors who share the same goals and 
beliefs, and rationally pursue them at least partly rationally. Nevertheless, subgroups 
and individuals within an organization that is created to solve some defined goals 
might try to use them to reach their own differing goals (Christensen et al 2004:40-41). 
In real life, the choice amongst alternatives is not just a question of satisfying 
efficiency, but also of allocating resources to different parts of the organization. In 
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this study, it will be attempted to detect coalitions between and within parties and 
other political groups on the immigration policy field in Spain.  Subsequently, it will 
be analyzed whether these coalition formations are decisive when policy is 
determined.   
 In order to solve the power struggles which may arise as a consequence of 
competing coalitions, very broad goals and actions may be chosen (Christensen et al 
2004:93). In this way, a higher level of legitimacy of the goals is achieved on complex 
issues. However, this kind of quasi-solutions decreases the possibility of forming a 
consistent policy. In this study, it will be evaluated whether quasi-solutions have arisen 
as a result of power-struggles and complexity.    
As indicated, even the instrumental perspective allows for a certain role of 
personal convictions in decision making. This indicates that not only formal structure 
and positions are deciding actors´ behavior. As will explored  in the following sections 
of this chapter, other more informal rules related to culture and the institutional 
environment may be just as significant in determining behavior.  
2.1.5 Empirical Expectations from the Instrumental Perspective 
• Spanish politicians are expected, according to the instrumental perspective, to 
make decisions based on incomplete information in the immigration policy 
field. This is due to the inherent complexity of the field and because 
immigration issues are of varying importance in comparison to other issues.  
• It is expected that Spanish politicians will shape policy and construct 
organizations related to immigration in a way that is reflecting a certain degree 
of rationality. In the hierarchical variant of the instrumental perspective, leaders 
are expected to have a relatively clear conception of goals. They are also 
expected to use the public organizations and policy measures as instruments to 
reach these goals.  
• The approaches of the government in office as labor-oriented or control-
oriented will be reflected in what ministry is given the responsibility for 
handling immigration issues. According to principles of horizontal 
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specialization, organizational solutions reflect how leading politicians place one 
policy field in relation to others.  
• As principles of specialization also guides how policy focused, it is expected 
that they will affect the political priorities in a two-way dynamic.  
• If firm political control of the immigration administration is wanted, 
administrative levels of the organization will be closely linked to the political 
level in the hierarchy.  
• Further, the organizational structure is expected to be most important in 
predicting behavior at the operational and administrative levels of organizations 
on the immigration policy field, while the political leadership is expectedly   
more unrestrained to pursue their conviction.  
• Specific subgoals will be pursued as a substitute for comprehensive overarching 
goals. This is because the immigration policy field is typically very complex 
and characterized by vague goals.  
• In addition, according to the coalition version of the instrumental perspective, it 
is expected that the interests of dominating subgroups will be reflected in the 
Spanish immigration policy. Relevant influential subgroups might consist of 
labor unions, organized employers´ interests, as well as subgroups within 
political parties.  
• It is expected that a complex policy field as immigration, where different 
influential subgroups are involved, will favor quasi-solutions of conflicts.   
2.2 The Cultural Perspective 
2.2.1 The Logic of Appropriateness 
In the cultural perspective, it is asserted that actors follow rules not as a result 
oriented consequential pro et contra calculation, but because of the institutionalized 
practices of a collectivity (March and Olsen 2006:4). Institutional actors find out what 
actions are appropriate through the matching of identities, situations and 
institutionalized rules. Additionally, actors carry with them connotations of essence 
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according to their role. It is claimed, institutional actors take actions after identifying 
what kind of situation they find themselves in, what kind of role they possess, and 
what kind of actions are expected from actors possessing that particular role. What will 
be central for the analysis is whether there are any significant measures taken by 
policy makers that reflect such instant matching between identities, situations and 
rules.   
The intuitional matching mentioned above is not only valid in routine 
situations. In crisis situations, it is argued that demands for radical change often follow 
identity-driven conceptions of appropriateness more than conscious calculations of 
cost (March and Olsen 2006:7).  
Institutionalization is a time-consuming process where values and identities   
related to aspects other than those relating to technical and efficiency are shaped 
(Selznick 1997:26). According to March and Olsen, the nearly automatic relation 
between rules and action will have a higher probability of being present in countries 
with legitimate, well defined, integrated and stable institutions. Spain is a relatively 
young democracy, with a rather short immigration history.  It will be interesting to see 
whether these variables limit the ability for Spanish politicians to make the instant 
matching which appropriate decisions are constituted of.   
In some situations it may not be possible for actors to do what the institutional 
rules prescribe is considered right and true, because of lacking institutionalized 
capabilities (March and Olsen 2006:10). In this way, it is problematic to assume a 
precise one-to-one relation between rules and policy outcome. The possibility to actual 
implement policy and not just the rules on the immigration policy field will therefore 
be studied.    
When it comes to the stability of rules, it is assumed that the current stability of 
rules is related negatively to the number of times they have been revised in the past 
(March and Olsen 2006:15). In contemporary democracies, which at best are only 
partly communities of shared experiences, competing interpretations of appropriate 
behavior are a routine part of daily life. In plentiful periods, competing rules of 
appropriateness may exist simultaneously since they are considered segmented, but 
resource reduction tends to call attention to inconsistencies.  
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In democratic governance, the balancing of different logics of action is required 
and politicians and political administrative leaders are likely to be held accountable for 
both the appropriateness and the results of their behavior. Notwithstanding, the two 
modes of accounting may sometimes counteract. Proper behavior might be associated 
with bad consequences, and good consequences might be the result of improper 
behavior (March and Olsen 2006:18). Consequently, it is of the essence to discern 
whether   political actions taken by Spanish leaders on immigration are accounted for 
on the basis of their consequences or on the basis of their appropriateness. 
In March and Olsen´s view, it is necessary to consider the alternative human 
motivations as complementary, rather than assume a single dominant behavioral logic 
(March and Olsen 2006:19). In this way, it might be possible to examine the 
variations, shifting significance, scope conditions and prerequisites that the different 
logics of action provide. To study shifting preferences on the immigration policy field, 
one approach would be to examine how the logics of action are formally prescribed, 
authorized and allowed, or on the contrary how they are defined as illegitimate.  
2.2.2  The Ambiguity of Appropriateness 
The basic assumptions in Christensen and Røvik´s alternative elaboration of the logic 
of appropriateness are that guiding rules and identities might be ambiguous, competing 
and conflicting and can change over time. Plus, it is underscored that the consequential 
logic of action is predominating as appropriate in rationalized, modern society 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999:159). In this view it is argued that actors, for example, in 
public organizations, rarely face unambiguous situations where they easily can resort 
to one clear-cut identity (Christensen and Røvik 1999:164). In addition, the 
encompassing environment is often turbulent which in turn provokes a complex 
attention structure, especially if alternative identities are conflicting.  
It is argued that the identity related to the formal organizational structure is 
dominant over culturally developed identities that actors may possess. The informal 
identities are, according to these authors, subordinate to formal conditions and less 
important for decision-making (Christensen and Røvik 1999:165). An actor´s formal 
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position is also very relevant concerning hers or his viewpoint, i.e. focuses very clearly 
on some aspects of an issue, but more unclearly on others (Røvik 2007: 283). Formal 
rules allow a certain degree of discretion. Accordingly, informal values and identities 
might be significant when discretionary decisions are allowed. It will be assessed 
whether the formal structure has a greater significance on outcomes on the 
immigration policy field than the cultural values and norms when the empirical 
material is analyzed.    
Unlike March and Olsen, Christensen and Røvik insist on the differentiation 
between informal and formal rules. Not only might formal and informal rules in an 
institution be conflicting, but the different formal rules can be conflicting with each 
other (Christensen & Røvik 1999:167-168). Informal rules are developed when actors 
interrelate with each other over a long time and come to take for granted certain ways 
of thinking and acting. If the informal rules threaten or even undermine the formal 
rules of an organization, they can be seen as inappropriate (Christensen and Røvik 
1999:169). Tolerating the presence of irregular immigrants can accordingly be 
sustainable for a limited time period. But at a certain point, politicians will be 
compelled to take measures that ensure the implementation of the immigration law. 
But the two sets of rules may also influence each other. The different sets of rules have 
different origins, effects and implications (Christensen and Røvik 1999:170). For 
example, new regulations concerning immigration policy can be made on the basis of 
means-ends considerations, but a public decision-making culture with counteracting 
dynamics may still exist within relevant public organizations. This has consequences 
for the analysis of the Spanish immigration policy field:  Formal rules, expressed in 
law and organizational structures will be kept apart from informal rules, expressed as   
values.  
2.2.3 Path-Dependency 
 Only thought through decisions can provide for the actual change of formal 
organizational structures. But these decisions are themselves the expression of the 
incremental adaption of the formal to the informal evolution that has already been 
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taking place (Egeberg 1984:48). One of the core points of the cultural approaches to 
organizational and institutional theory is that choices of institutional change constrain 
future options for new changes; they are path-dependent (Krasner 1998:67). Further, it 
is argued that policymakers have a range of options which is the function of 
institutional capabilities put in place at some earlier period. Accordingly, this is in 
stark opposition to utilitarian approaches. New logics of action are interpreted most 
often as the result of coincidences instead of the aggregated result of principal actors 
who are looking to increase their personal utility (Selznick 1997:23). In this way, it 
will be studied how earlier events and the institutional framework limit the choices 
that are possible for Spanish leaders in shaping immigration policy.  
  Change is not something instantaneous or costless in the path-dependency 
theory. But even if institutions do not change rapidly and responsively to 
environmental pressures, it does not mean that the path-dependency theory excludes 
the possibility of change (Selznick 1997:101-102). But the critical junctures are 
considered to be infrequent and are expected to be followed by long periods of 
stability. When path-deciding decisions are being made, goals are not always clear, 
and these situations therefore require institutional leadership. In turn, the decision will 
determine the values of the institution in the future. Determining which instances 
represent such critical junctures of the evolution of Spanish immigration policy is 
therefore essential.  
If patterns of behavior and formal structures are to last over long periods, this 
will be decided by the degree of institutionalization of a particular organization or 
policy field. Institutionalization in turn, is decided by two dimensions: vertical depth 
and horizontal linkage. Vertical depth is defined by the degree of self-definition which 
relevant actors possess in relation to a particular institutional structure. The stronger 
this self-definition is, the more difficult it will be to change the structure, and it will 
certainly not be undermined by its loyal members. The general consensus between 
institutional actors on the meaning of events is produced by shared paradigms or 
shaped by roles.  
If a particular organization or policy field cannot be changed without other 
important fields being affected, there is a significant degree of horizontal linkage 
24 
 
(Krasner 1988:75). If migration policy is linked to other policy fields, like the agrarian 
sector and labor policy, it will be increasingly difficult for Southern European 
countries to change it without also affecting those sectors. Accordingly, it will be 
attempted to evaluate the importance of the adjacent sectors which have the most 
important linkages to the immigration policy field in Spain, when it comes to political 
outcomes.  
In some organizations, there might also be strong internal resistance to 
reorganizations which are conceived as threats by powerful subunits (Krasner 
1988:83). It might be in the interest for certain employers, to conserve an immigration 
system that ensures large quantities of cheap irregular migrant workers. Path-
dependent patterns, which are characterized by self-reinforcing positive feedback, are 
also a powerful contributor for institutional persistence. Choices at an early stage of 
history can look small and even random. Nonetheless, they can determine to a 
significant extent future trajectories (Krasner 1988:84).    
2.2.4 Increasing Returns  
In Pierson´s view, some researchers are inclined to employ an excessively broad 
definition of path-dependency, as it is only asserted that what happened was affected 
by something that happened earlier (Pierson 2000:252). This leads to imprecise 
conclusions because this kind of definition avoids revealing the particularly interesting 
mechanisms within path-dependency, of which Pierson focuses on the concept of 
increasing returns. This type of path-dependency means that the current mode of 
action is increasing its relative benefits, because the alternative options remain unclear 
while the chosen mode of action is little by little more known by the institution´s 
members. It will be judged whether the choices taken on the immigration policy field 
in Spain lead to dynamics of increasing returns.    
 According to Pierson, increasing returns do not guarantee the conservatism of 
policy and institutions, but instead asserts that continuous change will happen as 
bounded change. Reform of the regulations concerning contracting worker immigrants 
in countries of origin was for example a substantial change of policy, even if it 
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happened within a well entrenched system of irregular immigration (Cachón 2009 
[Interview]). Accordingly, it will be attempted to detect a determined maneuvering 
space for Spanish leaders on the immigration policy field where changes might be 
carried out.   
 The timing of critical junctures obtains an even more emphasized role in 
Pierson´s approach to path-dependence than in the classical view described earlier. 
This is because decisions that may appear insignificant at an early stage of a process 
can put in motion sequences that ultimately lead self-reinforcing structures of 
increasing revenues. As a reflection of this dynamic efforts later in the process may 
have only limited effects. If critical junctures are revealed in the evolution of Spanish 
immigration policy, attention will also be devoted to the specific context in which the 
dynamics were set off.    
In most cases, politicians favor short-term gains, and will tend not to be too 
occupied by long-term risks (Pierson 2000:261). This is partly due to the fact that their 
personal incentive to achieve long-term solutions is limited by the fact that their terms 
typically span around periods of not much more than four years. Decision rules within 
political institutions are also in many cases conservatively biased, and therefore 
constitute another obstacle for efficient changes. Tolerating large quantities of 
irregular immigrants can for example seem as a tempting solution for politicians in a 
country, as expulsions and building administrative capabilities are costly in the short 
term. The longer term risks as problems of social cohesion and structural problems in 
the economy typically come in the background. 
2.2.5 Gradual Transformation 
The classical path-dependency view is leading us towards the impression that 
institutional change is infrequent and abrupt, or very modest. Streeck and Thelen 
present a critique of the path-dependence concept as they see the tendency to explain 
most new phenomena as being just variants of the old path-dependent pattern as 
having an exaggerated conservative bias (Streeck and Thelen 2005:2). Instead they 
propose the concept of gradual transformation in institutions as a tool for exploring 
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institutional changes. The key aspect of this approach is that broad and multifaceted 
developments can unfold incrementally (Streeck and Thelen 2005:6). The increasing 
returns that are preached in the path-dependency theory are considered in the 
transformative change approach as being much more helpful in understanding 
institutional resiliency than institutional change (Streeck and Thelen 2005:8).  
It is conceded, institutional change is at times abrupt and sharp. But this does in 
no way exclude other ways of transformation (Streeck and Thelen 2005:11). 
Particularly when policy fields of modern Western societies are analyzed, where one 
cannot expect dramatic path changing upheavals, it is important to take into account 
incremental processes of change that add up to major historical discontinuities 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005:12).  
Finding out what a rule actually means is not self-evident and is a constant 
process that requires efforts to develop and maintain a shared understanding in the 
community (Streeck and Thelen 2005:20). When rules are decided by politicians, it 
cannot be assumed that they are aware of the full variety of situations to which the 
particular rules have to be applied to. Innovative future politicians may deliberately 
interpret earlier established rules in a way that was unintended when the rule was 
established. Questioning the true meaning of institutionalized rules is often an 
intentional revision (Streeck and Thelen 2005:21). The intentional questioning of rules 
might be affirmed by studying how new governments interpret rules passed by their 
predecessors. 
Further, the concept of differential growth may lead to significant outcomes as a 
result of gradual transformation. This concept means that institutional actors learn to 
work around unchangeable traits in institutional arrangements (Streeck and Thelen 
2005:23). Instead, by layering new elements with a certain focus, while consistently 
omitting other possible solutions, the outcomes may be significantly altered in the long 
term. Consequently, this study will attempt to uncover strategic layering on the 
immigration policy field.   
Transformation may also occur as a result of mass deviant behavior. If the 
deviance reaches a certain level, the only way to end it is making the behavior legal 
(Streeck and Thelen 2005:22). Political leaders, who pretend to control institutions, 
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never have complete control of their functioning and their goals. Accordingly, it will 
be explored if mass deviant behavior influences the rules on the Spanish immigration 
policy field.   
As we have seen in the first part of this theoretical chapter, the cultural perspective 
asserts the uniqueness of institutions, as they come to possess actors who possess 
common values, norms and interests. The myth perspective on the other hand, is 
primarily focused on the institutional environment. In this environment, organizational 
myths that tend to look at all institutions as more or less the same (isomorphism) have 
gained impact during the last decades. In the next chapter, I will account for both the 
conventional view on the myth perspective, as well as explore an alternative view that 
underscores the potential instrumental uses of myths. 
2.2.6 Empirical Expectations from the Cultural Perspective 
• From the logics of appropriateness approach of the cultural perspective, 
relevant actors on the immigration policy field, notably Spanish politicians, will 
expectedly be heavily influenced by what is regarded as appropriate for the role 
they possess. This is because the cultural perspective gives importance to 
informal norms, and not just formal roles.  
• Complexity, rather than simplicity, of preferences and value sets will be a 
prevailing trait. How clear values are for institutional actors, depends on the 
degree of institutionalization, which in turn is partially dependent on the time 
variable. Thus it is expected that the short time-span of Spanish immigration 
history will influence negatively on actors´ internalization of informal values 
regarding immigration policy.  
• It is expected that the broader institutional context will delimit the range of 
action on the Spanish immigration policy field. Because of possible horizontal 
linkages to other policy fields and institutions, it is affirmed in the cultural 
perspective that any given institution might be difficult to change.   
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• Political debates are expected to reflect competing interpretations of what 
appropriate behavior consists of, and which kind of values are to be employed, 
and not the power-struggles between rational self-interested actors. 
• Opposed to the importance that the conventional culture perspective gives to 
informality, it will from an alternative approach be expected that the formal 
roles and norms will override informal rules and identities when decisions are 
made on the Spanish immigration policy field. According to the ambiguity of 
appropriateness approach, the informal culture will be deciding primarily if the 
formal rules are ambiguous.  
• If informal values which run counter to the formal rules are present, they will 
not be tolerated for a long time. Irregular immigration will probably be the most 
important informality in this kind when it comes to the case of immigration 
policy in Spain.  
• According to the theory of increasing returns in path-dependency, it is expected 
that the lock in effects on the immigration policy field will benefit particular 
sectors of Spanish society. In this view, path-dependent dynamics of increasing 
returns might also surge by coincidence, and not necessarily as a result of 
conscious choices.    
• Actions of Spanish politicians on the immigration policy field are expected to 
reflect short term strategies which may undermine strategic instrumental 
solutions. Because of rather short election cycles, democratically elected 
politicians might have few incentives to pursue longer term solutions.  
• Alternatively, from the gradual transformation approach of the cultural 
perspective, the inflexibility of Spanish immigration policy field will not be 
taken for granted, even in situations that are not interpreted as windows of 
opportunity. Changes which seem small at the outset will not be ignored as they 
might have significant consequences at a later stage. Both politicians and other 
institutional actors are therefore expected to be intending to set of path-altering 




2.3 The Myth Perspective 
2.3.1 Formal Adaptation Does Not Mean Actual Implementation  
In modern institutions, the appropriate identity is very often that of seeming to act 
rationally. As a consequence of this institutional pressure towards acting rationally, 
rationalized myths might grow and flourish as they are receipts of what is to be seen as 
modern instrumental and rational ways of organizing (Christensen and Røvik 
1999:171). However, even if myths give the impression of being effective does not 
mean that they necessarily work this way when organizations try to adopt them 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999:172). Still, rationalized myths are taken for granted in 
the institutional environment and appear to be objective laws for institutional actors. 
Rationalized myths have emerged mainly because of the strong belief in rationality, 
science and economic growth in contemporary Western institutions and beyond. To 
legitimize behavior and act appropriately is to adopt the rationalized myths, which are 
symbols of this ideology. In respect to the theoretical insight of the myth perspective, 
Spanish leaders´ statements and justifications for adopting new policies of immigration 
will be examined in order to expose references to rationalized organizing. Further, 
references to the expectations of the institutional environment by policy makers are of 
interest when reorganizations and policy changes are carried out.  Particularly explicit 
references to the European Union, as a possible myth producer, are central.   
The institutionalized environment is very important for organizations and 
institutions, as these are driven to incorporate the structural arrangements proscribed 
by rationalized concepts of organizational work (Meyer and Rowan 1991:41). In this 
view, the motivation for doing so is to obtain legitimacy, and thus increasing the 
prospects for the institution to survive. Sometimes this is a mere ceremonial 
conformity, especially if the myths are conflicting with technical efficiency criteria. 
This may lead to a gap between the structural arrangements and the actual behavior in 
the institution. The prime example of this hypocrisy in this thesis is the formal strict 
immigration policy of Spain, which has not only been ignored by immigrants and 
employers, but also by the government. 
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In an instrumental perspective, a rational formal structure is supposed to be the 
most effective way to control and coordinate modern work activities (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991:42). Notwithstanding, there is a sharp distinction between the formal 
structure, which is the blueprint of organizational activities, and the actual day-to-day 
institutional life.  The instrumental perspective described above assumes that in 
organizations coordination is routine, rules are followed, and that actual activity does 
what is prescribed in the formal structure (Brunsson 2006:7). The view Brunsson 
criticizes takes for granted legitimacy and treats norms of rationality as simple and 
general. In modern societies, the binding rationalized myths on particular 
organizations are empowered by institutional rules, by for example laws and social 
prestige. These myths are characterized as rationalized because they identify various 
social purposes as technical ones (Meyer and Rowan 1991:44). In this way, subjective 
opinions are presented as objective facts. They are also highly institutionalized, since 
they are to a great extent taken for granted and do not need to be justified every time 
they are to be implemented. Modern society is dominated by rationalized myths and 
modern institutions are thoroughly rationalized, consequently, the more modern a 
society is, the higher the likelihood for formal organizations to appear (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991:46). Spain has gone through a profound modernization during the three 
last decades (Casey 2010 [Telephone interview]). Accordingly, it will be examined 
whether the modernization of Spanish society in general has influenced the handling of 
the immigration policy field.  
Another important prerequisite for the impact of rationalized myths consists of 
the assumption of all formal organizations possessing basically the same traits 
(Christensen and Røvik 1999:173). This leads to a larger degree of institutional 
isomorphism, which means that organizations will try to look more like other 
organizations on the field (Powell and DiMaggio 1991:66). This is a severe 
underestimation of the variety of the tasks, personnel culture, localization, knowledge 
and technology of the organizations in the world today. Organizations are structured 
by exigencies in their environments and tend to become isomorphic firstly because this 
helps the organizations to manage the complex interdependencies with their 
surroundings (Meyer and Rowan 1991:47). As all institutions exist in a social world, 
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they will necessarily reflect the socially constructed reality. The uniqueness of each 
organization, which is emphasized in the cultural perspective, tends to disappear in the 
myth perspective, as organizations tend to disappear as distinct and bounded units. The 
implications of these two accounts also have implications that differ significantly. In 
this way, it will be explored whether the solutions on the Spanish immigration policy 
field represent isomorphic tendencies, which are required by the institutional 
environment.    
As a consequence of isomorphism, organizations incorporate structural 
elements which are legitimated externally, rather than in terms of efficiency.  Further, 
they employ ceremonial assessment criteria to evaluate these structural elements, and 
turbulence will be reduced by the dependence on externally fixed institutions (Meyer 
and Rowan 1991:49).  Finally, the institutional isomorphism will increase the 
likelihood of an organization´s survival. Organizations that do not adopt 
environmentally legitimated elements of structure, risk lacking acceptable legitimated 
accounts of their activities (Meyer and Rowan 1991:50). In this study, it will be 
attempted to reveal what the relevant ceremonial assessment criteria consist of. This 
will for instance include the expressions of evaluation of Spain´s immigration policy 
by external actors in the institutional environment.  
The institutional environment stabilizes both external and internal 
organizational relationships; organizations are buffered from turbulence (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991:52). The commitment to the organization is guaranteed by agreements 
instead of depending entirely on performance.  
As all organizations, in varying degrees, operate in both relational and 
institutionalized contexts, they must not only coordinate and control their activities, 
but must additionally be successful in accounting for them (Meyer and Rowan 
1991:54). Increasingly, modern organizations use variable, ambiguous technologies to 
produce outputs that are not easily appraised. Further, the uncertainties cannot be 
solved exclusively on the basis of efficiency, as even technical properties of outcomes 
are socially defined (Meyer and Rowan 1991:55).  Following this logic, it will be 
studied how Spanish political leaders account for the official activities on the 
immigration policy field.  
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As we have seen already, conforming to ceremonial requirements is an 
important source of legitimacy in modern society. Rejecting them will neglect an 
important source of resources and stability (Meyer and Rowan 1991:57). Partial 
solutions as isolation, acknowledging deviation or promising reform all define the 
organization´s current structure as illegitimate. Instead, Meyer and Rowan propose two 
interrelated strategies, namely decoupling and the logic of confidence.  
Decoupling means that elements of structure are being kept apart from activities 
and from each other, in order to avoid the conflicts and loss of legitimacy which 
attempts to control and coordinate activities can produce. This decoupling involves 
performing activities beyond the purview of supervisors or by making goals 
voluntarily ambiguous, or by ceremonializing inspection and evaluation.  In 
immigration policy, a country can formally agree on readmission treaties with 
countries of origin, because this is accepted as an effective means of limiting the 
presence of irregular immigrants. Tacitly, the country can continue to tolerate the 
presence of irregular immigrants at the same time. Ergo, the decoupling shields the 
assumption of formal structures as really working from the real world anomalies 
involved in technical activities (Meyer and Rowan 1991:58).  Possible decoupling 
between official policy and practice on the immigration policy field in Spain will duly 
be studied.  
As rationalized formal structures are highly institutionalized in modern society, 
the confidence and good faith in an organization by internal participants and external 
constituents enables it to appear useful in spite of the lack of technical validation. Both 
the internal participants and external constituents have a common interest in this good 
faith. As it maintains the confidence in the organization, it ultimately contributes to the 
reinforcement of the confidence of the myths that rationalize the organization´s 
existence. Uncertainty can be handled only if people assume that everyone does what 
they are supposed to and performing their roles properly. If an organization is strongly 
reflecting institutionalized myths, according to Meyer and Rowan, there is a high 
probability that it will maintain elaborate displays of confidence, both externally and 
internally (Meyer and Rowan 1991:59). Loyal organization members must coordinate 
informally to ensure that activities run smoothly, in spite of the categorical rules.  
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Organizations which operate in institutionalized environments tend to make 
inspection and evaluation as ceremonial as possible, since these processes risk to 
uncover deviations that undermine legitimacy. These processes are public assertions 
that run counter to the fundamental assumption that everyone is acting in good faith, 
which in turn lowers moral and confidence. In this theoretical approach, not only 
institutional actors within the organizations avoid inspecting and controlling, but 
external constituents as well. For example, control organs within the European Union 
are expected to “accept ceremonially at face value the credentials, ambiguous goals, 
and categorical evaluations that are characteristic of ceremonial organizations” (Meyer 
and Rowan 1991:60). The control organs are in fact themselves probably corporately 
organized agents of society, and need to assume that formal organization is reflecting 
activities. Accordingly, it will be evaluated whether the relevant external controllers of 
Spanish immigration policy accept the formal organization and official policy at face 
value.   
As has been shown, Meyer and Rowan are primarily fascinated by the strict 
decoupling of rationalized myths of formal organization from the actual activities 
within institutions. In this view myths have little or no effect on actual behavior in 
organizations, other than that the decoupling may in the long run contribute indirectly 
to the long-run effectiveness. This assumption is not very realistic according to an 
alternative view on rationalized myths that emphasize that over time myths that 
initially are being kept apart gradually gain influence also on the practice of an 
organization.  
2.3.2 Instrumental Use of Rationalized Myths and Myths as Viruses 
In opposition to Meyer and Rowan, Røvik asserts that rationalized myths are not 
merely innocent ideas which flow through organizations without making a real impact. 
They are ideas of reform which can lead to very real changes in the organizations 
which they permeate (Røvik 2007:19). In addition, Røvik argues that there is little 
empirical evidence of decoupling of formal structure and actual activity. Instead of the 
mimetic change approach, Røvik proposes a pragmatic institutionalism, where the 
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instrumental effects of popular organizational recipes do not exclude them from also 
being constructed symbols, that create meaning and have legitimizing effects (Røvik 
2007:53). 
When ideas are brought into new institutions, they normally enter a complex 
context of physical-material structures, formal structures, routines and procedures as 
well as the invisible organizational culture (Røvik 2007:293). This is what leads to the 
need to understand the process of contextualization of rationalized myths. This process 
includes both how the ideas are being reshaped by the context and also how they have 
a very real impact on the context.  
Sometimes, actors who try to implement new ideas attempt to adapt them to the 
specific context which the institution faces, while at the same time staying true to the 
spirit of the myth (Røvik 2007:311). Another possibility is the radical transformation, 
which means that actors are only inspired by different practices in other organizations 
and use some of the ingredients in their own organizational recipe (Røvik 2007:315).  
Traditionally, reforms that are not instantly translated into practical 
implementation by the organization have been regarded by researchers as failures 
(Røvik 2007:333). However, this view omits time as an important variable, and the 
patience of successful reformers. In Røvik´s central argument, it is held that 
organizational talk can function like a virus, which after a certain period of incubation 
will have an outbreak and also change the practice in the organization.  For instance, 
standards of immigration policy that are defined by the institutional environment may 
at first not have any apparent effects on the actual policy of a given country.  
The most important insight in the virus theory, and the most interesting 
common trait of rationalized myths and actual viruses, is that they often both require a 
period of incubation before they cause substantial effects. In this way, this theory 
includes the variable time in the equation, in a way that both instrumental rational 
choice institutionalism and the conventional myth perspective omit (Røvik 2007:350). 
In the first step, organizations are ‘contaminated’ by the specific language of a new 
organizational idea. After lingering in the language for some time, it may materialize 
by also influencing the actual practice of the organization. As an extended time scope 
of the immigration policy of Spain is studied, it might also be possible to reveal the 
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significant effects of myths on the actual content of policy.  It will be asserted whether 
actors on the Spanish immigration policy field come to regard the myths originating in 
the institutional environment as their own, due to the virulent potential of ideas.    
Røvik argues that the decoupling of the formal structure and actual practice 
within organizations will probably be discovered by either external actors or internal 
organization members (Røvik 2007:353). Leaders, who wish to be taken seriously, 
must assure that the organizational recipes are actually taken into use. When a 
rationalized myth is introduced to an organization, the first period is typically 
characterized by enthusiasm, especially articulated by the leadership (Røvik 
2007:358). Then, the idea may be deactivated for a long time, and become invisible, 
but does not disappear entirely. At the third stage, the idea can reappear with a slightly 
different content. One modernistic interpretation of the reactivation phenomenon 
asserts that organizations and policy fields are faced with recurring problems. As these 
problems reemerge occasionally, organizations have incorporated standard solutions 
(Røvik 2007:359). Altogether, the virus theory underscores the importance of the 
complex relationship that exists between ideas and practice, and that they cannot easily 
be kept apart.  
In the alternative elaboration of the myth perspective, institutions and 
institutional actors are not only passive receptors of organizational recipes. As noted, 
rationalized myths might be adapted to the specific context of an institution. But 
specific myths might also surge within a specific context, and active institutional 
actors might try to export the idea to the broader institutional environment (Røvik 
2007:270).  This means that rationalized myths exist within a dynamic relationship 
between individual institutions and the institutional environment. Accordingly, it will 
be attempted to study whether Spain has been able to export specific rationalized ideas 
on the immigration policy field to the institutional environment.   
2.3.3 Empirical Expectations from the Myth Perspective 
• It is expected that the formal structures on the Spanish immigration policy field 
will not necessarily reflect the actual activities that are being performed. In fact, 
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it might even be necessary to keep the formal structure and practice apart. 
According to the myth perspective, decoupling of organizational talk and 
organizational actions might be necessary in order to secure the smooth 
functioning of an institution.  
• In the logic of the myth perspective, it is expected that Spanish political leaders 
will be dominantly occupied by providing an impression of a well functioning 
immigration system. Because great prestige is attached to formal structure in 
modern society, adapting formal structure is more important than adapting 
actual practice on the immigration policy field to achieve such an impression.   
• According to the classic interpretation of the myth perspective, legitimacy is a 
primary concern for institutional actors. Therefore it is expected that politicians 
associate great value to the institutional environment, both when it comes to 
internal and external constituents. The internal constituents would be the 
general Spanish public, while the European Union itself and Spain´s European 
partners constitute the external constituents.    
• In order to obtain legitimacy from the institutional environment, it is 
underscored in the myth perspective, Spanish political leaders must implement 
formal rules and structures which are regarded as rational solutions to 
immigration policy challenges in the institutional environment. As these 
rationalized solutions are taken for granted by the institutional environment, it 
is expected that they will be prioritized even over more technically efficient 
solutions which are not endorsed by the institutional environment.  
• In the elaborated view of the perspective, however, powerless ideas will not be 
taken for granted. It will be expected that prevailing ideas on immigration 
policy, which are passed on to structure will after some time have a very real 
effect on actual behavior of institutional members as well. In very general 
terms, it will therefore be expected that Spanish politicians will apply 
rationalized measures, which actually have an impact on the practice within the 
policy field.  
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• Further, if rationalized myths that are imposed by the institutional environment 
are kept alive for a long time, Spanish politicians and other institutional actors 
will probably come to regard these descriptions as their own.   
• Additionally, in the instrumental approach to the myth perspective, it is 
expected that Spanish leaders, as institutional actors, have the possibility to 










3 Methodology  
3.1 Case Study Research 
3.1.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Research Designs 
The choice of a case study research design will firstly have implications for the type of 
data that will be collected. However, it should be noted from the start that the 
difference between quantitative and qualitative data is not to be treated as a dichotomy 
(Grønmo 1998:74). It is more a scale between two extremes, where the pure statistical 
study analyzes metric data, while a qualitative study for instance studies only written 
texts. In between however, there are a number of possible variants. 
A large statistical comparative study would for instance gather quantitative data 
from a large population of nations regarding several, although limited, variables in 
order to reveal the differences in policy. This kind of study would be able to reveal 
systematic correlations between the variables, and could therefore indicate what 
independent variables had most effect on the dependent variable. However, it is argued 
that in order to reveal deeper knowledge about a specific theme a qualitative case 
study is more in order. This is because the statistical quantitative approach will not be 
able to say much about the causal mechanisms that take place between the dependent 
and independent variables. Causal mechanisms are identified when the general 
knowledge of the world is put together with empirical knowledge of how the 
independent and the dependent variables interrelate (Gerring 2004:348). Quantitative 
data will show the statistical likelihood of a dependent variable being present, given 
the presence of a pre-defined set of independent variables. Further, this quantitative 
research design is applied if one wants to infer generalizations which apply to a large 
universe. On the other hand, it might not be able to detect important details that are 
crucial for explaining why the co-variations are observed, especially since other 
factors which may influence the dependent variable are not included in the regression 
analysis. In short, if the ambition of a study is to achieve great breadth and 
boundedness of its hypotheses, there is greater need for cross-unit cases, while causal 
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arguments that apply to only a small number of units call for a single-unit study 
(Gerring 2004:347). A case study of the Spanish immigration policy field probably 
offers better evidence for an argument about immigration in Southern Europe, than 
about immigration to the European Union as a whole. When studying a given policy 
field within a given country, there are institutions, processes, actors and the dynamics 
between them which decide the outcomes. These factors are not easily transmitted into 
numerical data, and therefore a qualitative research design might be more suited for its 
study. This will allow the gathering of rich data about this one theme, including 
different aspects and the historical evolution of policies and institutions. Choosing a 
crucial case might be an alternative strategy for providing evidence for causal 
propositions of broader reach than what is normally attributed to case studies. But 
finding especially representative cases will probably be very difficult.  It is the 
research theme and the research question which should decide what kind of research 
design is to be chosen, and not the other way around (Grønmo 1998:75). Even if the 
qualitative case study design is chosen in this thesis, it is in no way originating in an 
ideological stance that regards this kind of study superior to quantitative research by 
default. Instead, it is a choice based on a pragmatic consideration.    
 Nevertheless, the data used in this thesis are moderately typical for qualitative 
studies, and not archetypical data, as participating observation or informal 
interviewing (Grønmo 1998:78). Broad survey questionnaires to for example Spanish 
politicians are not employed either. Not only would the expected response rate tend to 
be low, but a statistical survey would probably be poorly suited for asking for 
informed comprehensions of complex political relations. Instead, a combination of 
different data is used to shed light on different aspects of the Spanish immigration 
policy field. These data include juridical analyses of law reforms, secondary literature, 
official government statements and three semi-structured interviews. Two of these 
were qualitative telephone interviews. The use of qualitative interviews will be 





3.1.2 What Kind of Case Is This? 
Even the simplest case study implies that it is a case amongst comparable cases in an 
analytical universe (Gerring 2004:348). According to John Gerring, a case study is 
best defined “as an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalize across a 
larger set of (similar) units” (Gerring 2004:341). From this optimistic definition, the 
co-variational empirical evidence for depicting causal relationships is not of a different 
nature in case studies than in statistical large-N studies (Andersen 2005:9). 
Paradoxically, case study method is severely criticized for not being sufficiently 
scientific, while vast amounts of scientific research are case studies. In this way, the 
first question to answer will be to indicate what the case to be studied is supposed to 
be a case of. Even if it is a single case study, the Spanish immigration policy field is 
situated in an analytical universe of comparable cases. These implicit comparable 
cases might be defined at three different levels. Firstly, it is a case study of 
immigration policy in a Western country in general. Secondly, it is an example of 
immigration policy in a country of the European Union. The third and smallest 
possible analytical universe of the Spanish immigration policy field in this thesis is the 
universe of relatively new Member States of the European Union on the Southern 
border of the continent. Implicit comparisons will be made to these universes 
throughout the study.   
It is argued that the case at hand is a macro case, as the object of study is a very 
large one, namely the evolution of a complex policy field over an extended time period 
(25 years). Moreover, when it comes to classifying the type of case study, this study is 
a theory interpreting case study. Accordingly, the general theories, in this case from 
organizational theory are used to shed light on and analyze the empirical data. In this 
way, the empirical data is systemized and organized by the theory, which makes the 
explanation easier (Andersen 2005:68-69). Various theoretical contributions will be 
employed to analyze the evolutions of the Spanish immigration policy field, in order to 
focus on different aspects of it. The empirical findings are in the next instance 
characterized in accordance to their theoretical relevance, which contributes to the 
understanding of concepts. The expectation of the within-case variation in the 
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empirical data being actively organized by the theoretical perspectives is another 
justification for choosing the theory interpreting design (Andersen 2005:70). As 
existing theories are employed to a new empirical case, a core challenge consists of 
finding the key concepts that systemize the narrative in the most efficient way. Key 
concepts in this study for instance include institutional pressure, specialization 
principles, political control and path-dependency. Consequently, this affirms the 
ambition of this study to compose a theory interpretive case study (Lijphart 1971:691). 
3.1.3 Limitations of Case Study Design 
The main reason for employing case study method is that the objects of interest often 
are processes and temporal evolutions, which are not easily captured by quantifiable 
data (Andersen 2005:34). This is also the reason why the case study research design is 
chosen for studying the evolutions on the Spanish immigration policy field. A 
qualitative case study is typically applied when the research question is of a 
descriptive analytical character and when a flexible research design is prioritized 
(Grønmo 1998:86). In this particular study, the flexibility has been important, as the 
inductivity of the research process has led to an expanding access to different sources. 
Studying secondary literature has induced the search for particular government 
documents, while an interview object from the explorative phase of the study guided 
the author towards new informants. Thus, the examination of one source leads to 
finding new sources. However, this flexible approach to sources may be tainted by the 
researcher´s desire, consciously or not, to reach certain conclusions (Grønmo 1998: 
86-87). This makes an analytical balancing of sources necessary. It is argued here that 
the qualitative approach is well suited for studying the Spanish immigration policy 
field, which is expected to be complex. Completeness will therefore be of the essence, 
as the shedding light on all relevant aspects of the research question is a priority 
(Grønmo 1998: 89). What is to be seen relevant is not entirely defined a priori, which 
probably would have been the case in a quantitative study. Though the relevance of the 
information provided from the open approach in qualitative studies is attractive, it 
comes at the cost of less accurate and verifiable data. It is not as easy from the outset 
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to make it plausible that any researcher would reach the same conclusions as this one 
by using the same sources while studying Spanish immigration policy.  
There is an eternal problem of great relevance in scientific theory regarding 
qualitative single case studies. While the case study is very well informing about the 
particularities and processes within the case that is studies, which means that it has 
high internal validity; it is logically problematic to say anything accurately about the 
comparable cases within the analytical universe. While searching under the light of 
street lights might be efficient, it is difficult to assess whether what we are looking at 
represents something practically or theoretically interesting. The mechanisms which 
describe and explain the evolutions on the Spanish immigration policy field might very 
well be interesting in their own right. Yet, they will not provide verifiable knowledge 
about the same dynamics in similar countries. On one hand the empirical complexity 
may be overwhelming for the researcher, but the theoretical potential is often 
underestimated (Andersen 2005:71-72). An alternative to a continuing expansion of 
the empirical data in search for the explaining narrative is to focus on the different 
possible theoretical interpretations. By using three different theoretical perspectives in 
this thesis, and variants among them, the ambition is to provide a more comprehensive 
account. By choosing the case study research design, a researcher wants to find out 
“both what is particular to the unit and what is general about it” (Gerring 2004:345).    
The very high degree of rich description in an empirical case study may also 
ultimately be problematic, and not just a virtue. This is because case studies are 
supposed to be balanced between building a thorough empirical insight, while at the 
same time analytically simplifying the material (Andersen 2005:130). This is another 
reason why it is very important to classify what kind of case is being studied from the 
outset. By reporting the analytical universe, the generalizability of the theories that are 
interpreted is indicated at the same time.    
There are two kinds of possible errors when it comes to making causal 
explanations based on scientific studies. Type-1 errors means falsely rejecting the null 
hypothesis, while Type-2 errors means failing to reject the false null hypothesis 
(Gerring 2004:350). Case studies are more inclined to tend towards Type-1 errors, 
while comparative studies naturally have a higher risk of Type-2 errors. But even if 
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case studies logically can be used to refute theories, these only very rarely produce 
detailed predictions on within-unit variation. For example, the hypotheses led out from 
the organizational theoretical perspectives on the changes in Spanish immigration 
policy in the preceding chapter are of a rather general character. It is very unlikely that 
any of these theoretical contributions will be definitely rejected or proved accurate 
with a single case study. In either way, the ambition of this thesis is not to ultimately 
prove or reject particular theories. Rather, it is to interpret empirical data with the 
perspectives of organizational theory.  
3.1.4 Data Foundation  
When it comes to sources, there are various caveats for the validity in a qualitative 
case study. Firstly, when official statements and documents are studied, or when 
conducting informant interviews, there are obvious challenges regarding the partiality 
of the sources. For instance, it would be expected that a government official, either in 
written statements, media appearances or informant interviews would tend to 
underscore that the government is pursuing an efficient and comprehensive approach 
to immigration with great success. Information given by such sources might be tainted 
by political convictions. It is also worth noting that with the same overstated intensity 
as in the self-praising from government sources, sources from the political opposition 
might be equally as excessive in their critique of government policy. Briefly, sources 
with clear political interests in having the research question to follow a certain 
approach should not be used for neutral information. However, by being conscious of 
the likely biased nature of these sources, there are good possibilities for using them to 
obtain information about their subjective perceptions of reality (Rubin and Rubin 
2005:72).  
Inevitably, the analysis takes place at the same time as the gathering of data in a 
qualitative study (Grønmo 1998:95). Constantly, when conducting interviews, 
studying documents or books, the researcher will have the theoretical conceptions in 
mind. Although thorough understanding of the object of study may be obtained, the 
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interconnections with other important affairs in society still risk becoming omitted 
(Grønmo 1998:96).   
  Within case studies are often complex, which makes it difficult to isolate causal 
variables at any given time, and the within-unit cases are often multiple and 
ambiguous, although the primary unit of analysis is usually clear (Gerring 2004: 344). 
In addition, it is also difficult to establish a clear line between the intensively studied 
unit and other neighboring units. In this way, it might be challenging to determine the 
limits between the Spanish immigration policy field and common European 
immigration policy, general labor policy or the complex relations between the Spanish 
central state and the autonomous communities. These last ones are the informal units 
of the study, which means that they are more superficially studied than the formal unit, 
which is Spanish immigration policy. The more attention a study gives to the informal 
units, the more it will resemble a cross-unit study. This thesis will only use these 
informal units with the motivation for explaining the analytical environment of the 
Spanish immigration policy field.  
 In this study, one in person interview was conducted with the Spanish professor 
of sociology Lorenzo Cachón, who as mentioned has conducted several studies of the 
relation between the Spanish immigration system and the country´s labor market. In 
addition, two telephone interviews were conducted. The first one was with the 
Migrations Secretary of the Catalonian branch of the Spanish union Comisiones 
Obreras, Ghassan Saliba, who has been involved directly in reform processes 
concerning immigration. The second one was with the Australian professor of political 
science, John Casey. John Casey has earlier conducted similar studies as this one about 
Spanish immigration policy (for example Casey 1998). Further, it was attempted to get 
in contact with the Spanish State Secretariat of Immigration and Emigration, as well as 
the Catalonian moderate nationalist party Convergència i Unió and the spokesperson 
on immigration of the major opposition party, Partido Popular. Regrettably, it has not 
been possible to obtain interview appointments in the last three cases. As a 
consequence, Mr. Saliba from the Comisiones Obreras is the only informant who is 
also representing a political entity.  
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3.1.5 Qualitative Telephone Interviewing 
The interaction between the informant and the researcher is open in qualitative 
interviewing (Grønmo 1998:85). This means that even in a semi-structured interview, 
it is possible for the researcher to pose follow-up questions and probes which come to 
mind. The informant may on the other hand contribute with relevant data that the 
researcher at the outset did not even think of asking about. Telephone interviewing is 
an interviewing mode which possesses obvious advantages in cost-effectiveness. In 
addition, a technological progress that has made telephone interviewing even more 
cost-effective is the possibility of making telephone calls through the internet. In this 
study, the software Skype has been used for conducting calls from Norway to Spain 
and to the United States. Internet phone calls are very cheap, or even free when the 
respondent has access to the same software, which makes it a tempting tool for 
gathering data. Nevertheless, cost alone cannot be accepted as an argument for 
choosing research method. The cost argument does not make sense if the data 
collected is of poor quality (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:110).  It must therefore be 
considered if telephone interviewing represents a greater risk to the validity than  in 
personal interviews. Telephone interviewing has received much attention in methods 
literature concerning quantitative interviewing. However, the interview mode of 
telephone interviewing in qualitative research has received little attention in qualitative 
studies, and comparison studies are almost entirely focused on the quantitative 
research design. In a research note, Sturges and Hanrahan, try to contribute to filling 
this gap in qualitative research literature. Their main research question was if the data  
collected in an actual study conducted by Sturges (1999) by using telephone 
interviewing was comparable to data collected in face-to-face interviews (Sturges and 
Hanrahan 2004:108).  
Traditionally, the suitability of telephone interviewing in the literature on 
qualitative interviewing is conferred to short and structured interviews, or if the 
situation is very specific. Rubin and Rubin (2005:125) underscore the last aspect. 
However, the suitability concern must be nuanced more than this.  
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A major challenge for qualitative research relying on interviews is informant 
reluctance. Telephone interviewing can in many cases make it considerably easier to, 
at first get in touch with, and then obtain data from potential respondents. This is valid 
both for people who are reluctant to appear in an in person interview, and for groups 
that are hard to reach (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:109). In this study, where it was 
intended to conduct interviews with public figures, such as spokespersons for political 
parties, public authorities and representatives from business and organized labor, the 
first aspect of this point is obviously the most important one. Instead of having to use 
significant resources on planning and travelling to Spain, internet telephone 
conversations were agreed upon in advance by e-mail correspondence. Arguably, it is 
considerably easier for people in these positions to make an appointment for a 
telephone interview than for an in person interview. The last interviewing mode would 
mean that they would have to either go to a suitable location or provide a suitable 
location for in person interviews at their own workplace. If anything unforeseen 
should happen, informants may easily reschedule, as telephone interview appointments 
are inherently rather flexible. On the other hand, there is a possibility that this can 
make it too convenient for the informant to cancel or reschedule, and that the 
importance of her or his participation is not perceived as being very high.  
The initial contact that is usually beneficial for obtaining telephone interview 
participants in my study was done indirectly. This meant that I first conducted an 
explorative face-to-face interview with an expert on Spanish immigration policy, the 
sociologist Lorenzo Cachón. He then agreed on putting me in contact with other key 
informants, who he regarded as essential for gaining insight in some central evolutions 
on the Spanish immigration policy field. Sturges and Hanrahan suggest that a first in 
person contact may be beneficial for obtaining an appointment for a telephone 
interview (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:111). In this study this was deemed 
unnecessary. The people I conducted telephone interviews with are semi-public figures 
or spokespersons, from who I argue I can expect a desire to tell about their version.    
When conducting telephone interviewing, as in opposition to face-to-face 
interviewing, the possibility for observing the informants non-verbal communication is 
deprived. But the nature of the interviews that are conducted for this study is not one 
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where non-verbal communication is regarded as essential. Academic and political 
informants are not expected to have much reluctance in sharing their views. 
In their study, Sturges and Hanrahan found that they obtained virtually the same 
quality of data from the telephone interviews that they conducted as those they 
conducted face-to-face (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:112). They also found that the 
depth of the answers were very much the same in both of the modes (Sturges and 
Hanrahan 2004: 112-113). This observation makes it plausible to assume what Rubin 
and Rubin  argue is the one main advantage of qualitative interviewing as a research 
method, mainly obtaining deep and informed data, is ensured (Rubin and Rubin 
2005:110). The respondents in Sturges and Hanrahan´s study were given the choice if 
they wanted to do the interviews in person or by telephone (Sturges and Hanrahan 
2004:113).  The most common reasons for choosing telephone interviews were privacy 
and convenience concerns. The last aspect here is expectedly the most essential one in 
my study, as the informants expectedly are rather busy people.   
As mentioned earlier, the telephone interview mode excludes the possibility for 
the researcher from observing non-verbal communication. However, the verbal clues 
that the informants provide, as hesitation and sighs, can give the researcher a hint if a 
follow-up question or a probe is in order. In this way, it is still possible to probe the 
informant, even if telephone interviewing precludes the researcher from probing based 
on visual clues (Sturges and Hanrahan 2004:114).  
3.1.6 Empirical Indicators of Theoretical Expectations 
Explaining a case study takes some of the same forms as detective work (Andersen 
2005:136). First the facts about the case need to be established. Secondly, the 
researcher needs to estimate what facts are relevant in solving the question at hand. 
Ideally, this should amount to the best plausible reconstruction of motives and 
possibilities that can account for the facts. The theoretical expectations from each 
perspective which were described in the preceding chapter must be linked to what the 
research will look for in the empirical material.  
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 In order to reveal factors that may be explained by the instrumental perspective, 
sources that describe the formal structures of organizations in the immigration policy 
field will be employed. Further, assessing the organizational thinking of political 
leaders on the immigration field will originate in how different aspects of immigration 
policy are linked together horizontally and vertically. When it comes to the cultural 
perspective, informal aspects that have an impact on policy outcomes will be sought 
after in the institutional context. These aspects may concern for example 
administrative culture or the Spanish labor market. Lastly, capturing aspects that may 
be explained by the myth perspective is most likely to be found in symbolic statements 
or actions. In these, references to prevailing rationalized myths are made. In the next 







4 Spanish Immigration Policy in a 
European Context 
4.1 The European Dimension 
4.1.1 The Mutations of the European Immigration System 
According to Geddes, there has been a considerable conceptual and geo-political 
widening of the concept of immigration to Europe since the end of the Cold War up 
until today (Geddes 2003:2). The Northern European countries are no longer the only 
countries of destination on the continent, as new types of immigration are having an 
impact in both Southern and Central European countries as well. In this section I will 
place my object of study, Spain, in this European context.  
In Casey´s view, the increasing European cooperation and integration on 
asylum and immigration within the EU frame is not to be seen exclusively as a 
challenge to the national sovereignty of Spain. The cooperation has made it easier to 
attain restrictive immigration policies and does not only imply a loss of control (Casey 
2010 [Telephone interview]). Individual European Member States still have 
considerable possibilities to determine their own policies. Therefore, it would also be 
misguided to view the Europeanization of immigration and asylum policies as a 
narrow path-dependent process that will inevitably lead to identical immigration 
policies in all of the Member Countries (Geddes 2003:6).  
Governments can claim that they are able to plan, regulate and manage 
migration flows. But migration policy seems more like muddling along in the face of 
unpredictable migration pressures (Geddes 2003:8). When it comes to the 
phenomenon of economic migration, it is not the poverty and demographic pressure in 
the sending regions which is the main reason for it, but the economic development in 
the industrious receiving regions and especially the number and characteristics of 
available jobs (Cachón 2002:111). Because of the economic take-off in the country 
and its labor market, this is what has turned Spain into a destination for migrants. The 
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argument is also a critic of the popular idea that the immigrants are taking jobs from 
domestic workers, as the jobs in question are below the latter ones´ level of 
acceptability.  
According to Cachón, several mutations of the European migratory system have 
taken place. The first one occurred after the Second World War, when the continent 
was divided into migrant receiving countries in the centre and north, and migrant 
sending countries in the south. In addition, North-African Arabs and Turks constituted 
important groups of immigrants in the receiving countries (Cachón 2002: 97-98). Even 
if the immigration into Western Europe was essential for the reconstruction of the 
countries, the assumption was that these would return to their countries of origin when 
the job was done. This assumption turned out to be false by the late 1970s, as the 
immigrants remained even as the continuous post-war economic growth came to an 
end (Geddes 2003:11-12).  
The second mutation took place in the seventies, when the ‘immigration stop’ 
concept was applied in Western European countries as a result of economic crisis. 
Paradoxically, the immigration which so far had mostly consisted of temporal work 
migration was converted into permanent settlement of the guest workers. This is 
because the incentive to return was removed as there were no longer guarantees for the 
migrants that they would be able to return later (Cachón 2002:99). As the door closed 
for immigration of unskilled workers, migration through family reunion continued, 
which led to a feminization of the immigration.  
Spain´s entry as an immigrant receiving country took place from the late 
eighties, just as for the other Southern European countries. This is what is called the 
third mutation of the European migratory system. Thus Spain, amongst others, was 
turned into a destination for migrants. This was as a consequence of the mentioned 
closing of the Northern countries, the economic development, and the proximity to the 
sending regions and also because of the traditional ties between both sides of the 
Mediterranean. In Cachón´s view, the new flows of migrants towards Southern Europe 
in the late eighties were not surprising in themselves. Because of the historic ties with 
the sending regions on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, regarding flows of 
people, commerce, capital and culture, the most surprising is that it did not take place 
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earlier (Cachón 2002:99). As countries in Southern, Central and Eastern Europe which 
now have been effectively turned into countries of immigration, the different labor 
market and welfare state contexts produce different outcomes here than in the older 
immigration countries to the North (Geddes 2003:12).   
The third wave of migration, or as Cachón calls it, the third mutation, after the 
two former waves of labor migration and family reunion migration, also included a 
particularly noticeable increase in asylum seeking migration and irregular migration 
(Geddes 2003:13).  When the numbers of asylum-seekers increased in the 1980s and 
1990s, receiving countries sought to restrict the inflows which they regarded with 
suspicion. Continued migration pressure, conflicts in various parts of the world and the 
practical impossibility to obtain legal labor immigration all contributed to the category 
of ‘bogus asylum seekers’ (Geddes 2003:14).  
However, it is irregular immigration which is the dominating aspect of 
immigration to countries in Southern Europe and not asylum-seeking. The variants of 
irregular immigration can be more or less dramatic and has come to include:  
• When people enter legally with a visa, and overstay the permit. 
• When people cross state borders without proper authorization and 
documentation.  
• When people live legally but work illegally.  
• When bureaucratic procedures consign people to illegality.  
Even if words as ‘flooding’ have been used to describe the migration pressure 
towards Europe, the states on the continent both have a formidable capacity and 
willingness to control immigration, especially those flows that have been regarded as 
unwanted (Geddes 2003:16). This has even included travails to outsource the control 
points of immigration to both transport companies and countries of origin (Pinyol 
Jiménez 2009:267). New control strategies have also developed, and complex webs of 
readmission agreements have been established with neighboring states to return 




4.1.2  Immigration Policy Cooperation within the European Union 
As more efficient solutions to problems concerning migration control have been 
sought, public policies have been increasingly internationalized (López Sala 2009:33). 
The main reason for this is that unilateral actions from individual countries are 
perceived as having very limited effects. On one hand, it may be argued that nation 
states have experienced a certain erosion of sovereignty on immigration policy. 
Therefore, the ceding of migration policy responsibilities to the EU might be regarded 
as a puzzle as it could hinder the individual Member States to adapt their policy to the 
domestic situation (Geddes 2003:126). On the other hand, the ‘Escape to Europe’ 
thesis says that the cooperation should be regarded as a reassertion of control capacity 
(Geddes 2003:127). However, Geddes moderates these two opposed views by 
confirming that the EU cannot be separated from national contexts, and that the effects 
on all European countries of immigration will not necessarily be the same (Geddes 
2003:128). Maintaining the strictly national scope of studies of immigration and 
immigration policies will probably not be sufficient in the contemporary supranational 
Europe. This is the reason that the implicit comparison to the general European 
immigration context will be guarded throughout this thesis.  
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 is regarded as the starting point of all European 
laws which override Member State laws. This includes those guaranteeing the right to 
free movement of EU citizens. Although the right of free movement was in the 
beginning a right for workers, it has been expanded to all EU citizens (Geddes 
2003:129). Naturally, market integration has provided a crucial impetus to cooperation 
on immigration and asylum. Even though Community encompassing efforts to abolish 
internal borders were rebuffed for a long time, significant dynamics were set in motion 
from some of the Member States. “The Schengen Agreement of June 14 1985 brought 
France, Germany and the Benelux countries together in a far-reaching attempt to 
abolish border controls with compensating internal security measures, including 
immigration and asylum” (Geddes 2003:130-131). This treaty allowed the Member 
States to continue market integration while maintaining restrictive immigration and 
asylum policies. For Spain, which was to enter the European Union the first of January 
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the following year, this signified that the country had to adapt its legislation to the 
communitarian norms. This was partly the reason that the first ever Spanish 
immigration law was passed in 1985, in addition to the need to handle the new 
phenomenon of immigration to Spain (Ospina 2008: 312). 
The Single European Act included a political declaration by the Member States 
stating the intent to cooperate on the entry, movement and residency of third country 
nationals, while at the same time stating that the Single European Act in itself did not 
mean any impact on their domestic immigration control policies. In this way, Member 
States could pursue their domestic immigration control policies at the European level 
without empowering EU institutions and also extend the restrictive policy frame to 
newer Member States in Southern Europe. During this development, the Commission 
was kept at arms´ length as Member States established forums as the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Immigration in 1986 (Geddes 2003:132).   
The Dublin Convention of 1990 sought to terminate the perceived problem in 
Member States of the possibility that asylum seeker would go ‘asylum shopping’ from 
one country to the next if their petition was to be rejected. However, the convention 
was not ratified until September 1997. Apart from this apparent efficiency problem of 
the informal cooperation, it was also undemocratic since decisions were made in 
closed forums without any accountability. However, this informal approach did 
achieve routine cooperation between the individual Member States´ interior ministries, 
which in turn meant that the cooperation was to be dominated by actors with a 
security-oriented understanding of migration (Geddes 2003:133).  
As this informal intergovernmentalism turned out to be problematic, EU 
countries had to rethink their cooperation, and landed on the compromise of an 
intergovernmental pillar of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in the Maastricht Treaty. 
In the treaty it was recognized that asylum policy, external frontiers, immigration 
policy and policy regarding third country nationals and combating unauthorized 
immigration were issues of common interest. Earlier supranational regulations on 
immigration were confined to standardizing visa regulations between Member States 
(Casey 1998:334). Further, the decision making was kept to unanimity within the 
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Council of Ministers, leaving a limited role for the Commission or the European Court 
of Justice (Geddes 2003:133-135). 
The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty implicated that immigration and 
asylum policies were communitarized, as it brought these policies into the Community 
pillar, but it did not make them subject to day-to-day processes of integration. When 
the treaty entered into force in 1999, its Title IV gave the Council of Ministers the 
responsibility to implement the free movement of persons and related external border 
control, asylum and immigration measures within five years. The Schengen agreement 
and its implementation were also to be incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty (Geddes 
2003:136). 
Common policy on asylum and immigration was once again in focus in the 
Tampere Summit in 1999, where agreed upon principles of the Amsterdam Treaty 
were to be rendered concrete (Miret 2009:69). The state leaders agreed that the 
common policy was to be based on partnership with countries of origin. In addition, a 
workable determination of the State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application with common standards on processing applications and fair treatment of 
third country nationals were consented. The official conclusions of the Tampere EU 
summit of 1999 were marked by an inclusive discourse (Cachón and Laparra 2009: 
20). This meant that the necessity of immigration in Europe and the need to secure 
comparable rights for third country nationals residing legally in the Member States 
were emphasized. However, the actual consequences have been more perceivable in 
tighter border controls and the adoption of stricter immigration policies.  
4.1.3 Irregular Immigration as a European Problem 
The European Council summit of 2002 in Seville has been regarded as the starting 
point of Spain becoming a driver of communitarian efforts to fight irregular 
immigration (Pinyol Jiménez 2009:275). The proposition of the Spanish government, 
led by the conservative José María Aznar, to withdraw development aid from countries 
of origin that did not cooperate in halting irregular migration was not accepted by the 
majority of the European partners, including the European Commission. However, the 
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Spanish government did succeed in consolidating the immigration question at the 
highest European level. 
Spain was criticized by the European Union throughout the 1980s and 1990s for 
not being tough enough on irregular immigration. Particularly the tendency to combine 
a tolerance for irregularity with occasional regularizations seems to have annoyed 
other European leaders. Nicolas Sarkozy, at that time interior minister of France, 
expressed this view after the regularization of half a million immigrants in Spain in 
2005 (Zapata-Barrero and De Witte 2007:89-90). However, it has been a tendency in 
the first decade of the 2000s that Spain is trying to push the European Union Member 
States into realizing that the irregularity problem in Spanish immigration is also a 
European problem. When it comes to the relations with countries on the southern shore 
of the Mediterranean, Spain has used these on the migration field as an opportunity to 
ascend to the first tier of European states. For instance, Spain was one of the initiators 
of the Barcelona Process that involves 15 EU Member States and 12 other 
Mediterranean states. (Geddes 2003:169).  
In 2006, the Spanish socialist government hosted a meeting in Madrid of all the 
foreign ministers and ministers of the interior of the European Union concerning the 
management of the maritime southern border. The Vice President of the Spanish 
government, María de la Vega, underscored the unreasonable high price the country 
was paying to govern the external border (De la Vega 2006). The proposed solutions 
of the Spanish government were to Europeanize to a larger extent the efforts and costs 
of border control, and it was asserted that only cooperation amongst the Member 
States could effectively fight irregular immigration. This included extra funding for the 
European border control agency Frontex, as well as common border controls and 
effective repatriation treaties with countries of origin. In addition, a more equitable 
repartition of the expenses linked to the humanitarian work for recently arrived boat 
immigrants was suggested by de la Vega. According to Pinyol Jiménez, the Spanish 
dynamism in the fight against illegal boat immigration has had an impact in the 
European approach to the joint governance of the union´s external border (Pinyol 
Jiménez 2009:282).  Basically, it has meant that the Member States of the European 
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Union have affirmed the important role of immigration for the union, including the ties 
with the immigrants´ countries of origin.  
4.1.4 Irregularity in the Southern European Immigration System  
While continuously narrowing down my topic, I will be placing Spain, the object of 
study not just within the European frame, but also in an implicit comparison with the 
other Southern European countries of Portugal, Italy and Greece. The dynamics of 
immigration are notably different than what has been the case in the North. There is a 
tendency to see these countries as having been or being in a catching up phase in 
comparison to the older immigration countries of the North, in terms of immigration 
policy. However, this dubious assumption implies that these policies have been 
marked by great success and attainment of objectives in countries as France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. This Europe´s ‘soft underbelly’ approach of the Southern 
countries runs as follows: “weak border control, leading to illegal immigration, 
creating havens for clandestine immigration” (Geddes 2003:150). Even if there are 
significant numbers of irregular immigrants in the older immigration countries too, it 
is not of the same scale as in the Southern countries. According to Cachón, the basic 
structural functionality of immigration control has more to do with market demands 
than the formal control shaped within ministries of the interior. In this way, limiting 
the dimensions of the secondary labor market, which is important in Southern Europe 
might be just as efficient for limiting immigration (Cachón 2009:162-163). The central 
dilemma for governments in these countries has been that while the EU and the public 
opinion are pressuring them to conduct strict external controls to manage migration 
flows, the deep-seated irregularity and informality of their economies are making the 
tackling of illegal immigration through tough labor market restrictions problematic.  
Further, the regularizations of illegal immigrants have been a distinctive feature 
of the immigration policy of these countries, which in fact run counter to EU policy. 
This concept basically means that “the State awards a permit of residency for a 
foreigner who is at the time living illegally on the State´s territory” (Apap et al 
2000:263).  In the regularization processes in Spain and in other countries there seems 
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to be an implicit principle of merit, as the immigrants eligible for regularization are 
those who have a paying job and who have not violated any laws other than being in 
the country illegally. The regularizations may on the one hand look as a manifestation 
of a faulty labor market. But they have a virtue in the short term in that they tend to 
relieve tensions which irregularity produces within society (Cachón 2009: 193-194).  
In comparison to countries in North Western Europe, there have been relatively 
low figures of asylum-seekers in the countries of Southern Europe. According to 
Geddes, one reason for this is that the alternative immigration dynamics and informal 
job opportunities led them to become illegal migrants instead of asylum seekers 
(Geddes 2003:156). 
The EU has apparently been an important driver of change in the immigration 
policy in the countries in Southern Europe. Cornelius even states that immigration 
policy itself in Spain arose almost entirely as a result of EU pressures (Cornelius 
1994:345). The pressure for strict immigration policies from the EU might be seen as 
fundamental misfit as migrants are needed in the labor market. In addition, 
implementation problems of the official policy in immigration control remain 
important (Geddes 2003:157). In Spain as well as in other countries, the EU pressure 
has been directed towards the external control policy. Opening the ‘Pandora´s box’ of 
internal controls and state-society relations does not seem to be an appealing 
alternative approach (Geddes 2003:163). However, as mentioned previously, Spain has 
also exerted pressure on immigration policy towards the European Union.  
4.2 The Evolution of Spanish immigration policy 
4.2.1 Spanish Political Parties and Immigration 
Between the two marginalized extremes of either complete closure of the borders and 
those who promote the completely free circulation of the entire world population, the 
political debate in Spain concerning immigration takes place between those who want 
a little more liberal policy and those who want a little more restrictions (Casey 
1998:338). However, the instant assumptions that the left of the political specter is 
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always more liberal are not necessarily always correct. For example the business 
sector of the right has on various occasions appeared more welcoming than some 
leftist unions, which see the competition of immigrants as a threat to wages. The 
general contemporary impression though, is a drift towards a more restrictionist stance 
on the whole specter, as is the case in other European countries (Saliba 2010 
[Telephone interview]).  
Zapata-Barrero employs a characterization of the political discourse on 
immigration in parliament not based on parties, but on whether the message of the 
intervention is classified as belonging to reactionary of pro-active discourse. (Zapata-
Barrero 2008:118-119). However, I will insist on placing the Spanish political parties 
based on their stance on immigration.  
The socialist party, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) has been the 
major party of the left in Spanish politics. The party has been influenced by its 
traditional ties with the Spanish trade unions, who are proponents of a ‘laboralized’ 
immigration policy that may provide realistic possibilities for legal entry for work in 
Spain for immigrants. Nevertheless, the PSOE, which is now in government, has been 
in ideological clashes with its partners in the unions on immigration policy because of 
a reform in 2009 that tightened the possibilities for family reunification. According to 
the regional migrations secretary of the union Comsiones Obreras in Catalonia, 
Ghassan Saliba, the present minister of labor and immigration, Celestino Corbacho, is 
trying to symbolize that his party can have an equally tough stance on immigration as 
the parties to the right (Saliba 2010 [Telephone interview]). 
The Partido Popular (PP) is the dominant party of the right in Spanish politics 
as well as the major opposition party. It was the first party to capitalize on the policy 
field in elections, by signaling that they were tough on immigration in the 2000 
general elections (Zapata-Barrera 2008:121). The PP effectively followed up on their 
promises by tightening the immigration law when they gained the absolute majority in 
Parliament after the mentioned elections.   
The Catalan centrist nationalist party, Convergència i Unió (CiU) should also be 
mentioned when counting the most important political forces in the field of 
immigration. As the PP was dependent on the CiU to rule effectively in the VI 
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Legislature between 1996 and 2000, their attempts to make a more restrictive 
immigration policy before the general elections of 2000 were thwarted by the CiU 
(Ospina 2008: 322). 
To the left of the dominant PSOE, lies the much smaller Izquierda Unida (IU), 
which traditionally represents views that favor the implementation of complete rights 
for foreigners, and criticizes repressive measures against irregular immigration. The IU 
has traditionally been defending the right of temporary workers to remain in Spain and 
promoting the irregular immigrants´ cause (Casey 1998: 335).  
The fear of a degeneration of the Spanish political discourse on immigration is 
shared by both sides, and there is a wish to avoid that extreme parties take electoral 
advantage as has been the case in other European countries (Zapata-Barrero 
2008:123). However the absence of an extreme rightist party in Parliament should not 
be regarded as an indicator of extreme rightist forces altogether. The PP includes 
members and visions that normally are linked to this kind of parties (Curiel 2008 
[Lecture]).  In addition to the radical right elements of the PP, some Catalan extreme 
rightist parties, like the Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) party,  are planning to present 
themselves on an explicit anti-immigration platform for the regional elections later in 
2010 (Saliba 2010 [Telephone Interview]).  
Further, both sides take advantage of the EU to legitimize their arguments by 
referring to the need to coordinate with the logics that the other Member States and the 
European institutions are following. From this point of view, anything that comes from 
the EU is regarded as good (Zapata-Barrero 2008:123). However, both proponents of a 
lenient immigration policy and those who support more restrictive measures have in 
the parliamentary debates employed a dramatic rhetoric. For example a typical 
intervention from one of the formers said that “It is not possible to fortify the territory, 
nor is it possible to make it impermeable to the consequences of famine” (cited in 
Zapata-Barrero 2008:128, author´s translation) to emphasize the global causes for 
migration. Equally dramatic are the metaphors employed by the immigration hostile 
side, which include expressions such as ‘invasion’, ‘plague’, ‘avalanche’, ‘wave’ and 
‘flood’ etc of immigrants (Zapata-Barrero 2008:127).    
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During the VII legislature, the PP made a point of the “calling effect” to justify 
the toughening of the legislation concerning foreigners. Following this logic, an 
excessively lenient and open legislation on foreigners would attract more immigrants, 
and the natural recipe against this would be a continual worsening of conditions for 
immigrants. (Zapata-Barrero 2008:129).   
4.2.2 1985-2000: A Vague Foreign Law and Administrative Leverage 
Migration in itself was by no means a new phenomenon in Spain in the 1980s. The 
country had for a long time experienced internal migration to the more prosperous 
regions of Basque Country, Catalonia and Madrid. However, the external immigration 
was a new experience, particularly from Third World countries (Calavita 1998:538-
539). 
Before the passing of Spain´s first immigration law of 1985, affairs concerning 
foreigners on Spanish territory were the exclusive competence of the General 
Directorate of Security within the Ministry of the Interior. The General Directorate 
administered the concessions, delegations and annulations of permits as well as the 
expulsions of foreigners. This was in accordance to the discretionary power it got from 
a Decree of Law from 1974, which interestingly predated the Spanish Democratic 
Constitution. In spite of this decree being declared unconstitutional, it influenced on 
the shaping of the immigration law of 1985 (Cachón 2009:168). On the other hand, 
immigrants from certain countries did not at the time need work permits.  
The first Organic Law on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain 
(Immigration Law) of 1985 resulted in a systematization of the existing regulations 
concerning immigrants, but also institutionalized the rigid border controls. Entry in 
Spain always had to be preceded by obtaining a visa, which in turn must be preceded 
by having an offer of employment. The law also provided important discretionary 
powers in sanctions against immigrants in an irregular situation (Cachón 2009:168).  
The law had the dual intention of both controlling illegal immigration and 
guaranteeing the rights of foreigners. Perhaps not surprisingly with two such 
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ambitions, the law was criticized for being “vague and imprecise” (Calavita 
1998:543). The Foreign Law included six main foci:  
1. The strict differentiation between foreigners from the EC (Communitarian 
Regime) and those from ‘Third Countries’ (General Regime). (In this study 
only the latter ones will be referred to as immigrants).   
2. The requirement of visas from non-EC entrants. Some third country nationals 
were exempt from the entry visa requirements though, like North-Western 
Africans, Latin Americans and people from other former Spanish colonies. 
However, this particular arrangement was not to last (Casey 1998:327).   
3. Those permitted to enter would need work and residence permits for stays 
longer than 90 days. As a consequence, the majority of immigrants living in 
Spain at the time became illegal from one day to the other.  
4. The legal resident´s limited rights were granted only insofar as they did not 
conflict with “national interest, security, public order, health, morality or rights 
and interests of Spaniards” (Foreign Law cited in Calavita 1998:544).  
5. The law made a sharp distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, 
explicitly excluding the latter ones. 
6. At last, the law stated the reasons for which foreigners could be deported from 
Spanish territory: Lack of proper residence and/or work permits, taking part in 
activities contrary to the public order or internal security, being convicted of a 
felony, and being without sufficient funds (Calavita 1998:544).  
The handling of applications for residency and work permits was organized under two 
different ministries, as the work permit applications were to be managed by the 
Ministry of Labor, while the residency permits were the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Interior (Cornelius 1994:345). However, the bureaucratic capacities soon turned out 
to be insufficient. When it came to effectively enforcing deportation of irregular 
immigrants, this was from the outset impeded by power struggles on the immigration 




As Geddes sees it, the immigration law for the first time defined the category 
‘immigrant’, which in the next stage made it possible to create the category ‘illegal 
immigrant’ (Geddes 2003:163). In practice, the results of this law were the closing of 
the legal ways for third country nationals to enter Spain, in addition to increasing 
problems for the foreigners who already were staying in the country. In turn, this made 
their integration in society more problematic (Ospina 2008:313). The virtual 
impossibility to legally enter Spain was caused by the provision that a worker had to 
obtain a visa while staying in the country of origin after obtaining a contract of 
employment from a Spanish employer. Before offering this kind of contract, the 
Spanish employer would need an official declaration stating that there were no 
available workers in Spain for the position in question (Cachón 2009:168-169).   
In spite of the fresh immigration law, the accelerating immigration in Spain 
from the late eighties was somewhat unexpected, at least at the beginning (Casey 2010 
[Telephone interview]). During the period of economic development from 1985, when 
Spain got its first foreign law, to 2002, both the origin countries of the immigrants and 
the immigrants´ profiles were changed. However, the Latin American immigration of 
this period was as the new flow from Northern Africa first and foremost a result of the 
‘pull factor’ of the perceived opportunities in the booming Spanish economy (Cachón 
2002:104).  
An organizational change took place in 1991, as issues concerning immigration 
were reorganized from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to the newly formed 
General Directorate of Immigration within the Ministry of Social Affairs (Casey 
1998:327). This signaled a change from a view on immigration management that 
focused exclusively on labor to a more holistic vision that included the first active 
integration policies.  
As the immigration law prescribed that obtaining and renewing a work permit 
was dependent on whether there were any Spaniards who were seeking the same kind 
of work in the same geographical area as the immigrant was applying for, immigrants 
effectively were relegated to the types of work that Spaniards did not want (Cachón 
2009:169). Official Spanish labor immigration policy has been based on two 
approaches. On the one hand, the principle of preference for national and 
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communitarian job seekers, and on the other hand a quota system of recruiting 
immigrants from third countries to precisely the type of jobs where the immigrants 
already constitute an important group. Accordingly, this tends to reinforce the 
segregationist and discriminatory tendency in the labor market (Cachón 2002:112).    
The first period of significant immigration to Spain was an effect of a change in 
the level of acceptability of certain jobs by Spanish nationals. Thus, various niches 
were opened for immigrant workers. This however, did not mean that the immigrants 
entered orderly and legally to Spain, the majority in fact entered undocumented. This 
was partly because of the total absence of ways to gain legal entry to the country for 
third country nationals. In the next turn, immigrants relied on formalizing their status 
later through the regularizations and the annual quota system. In other words, the 
administrative regulations were not able to keep up with the development of the 
demand for unskilled labor. The regularization processes and applications from 
solicitants to legalize their status were meant to compensate for this situation for 
immigrants already staying in Spain, and not to induce further immigration (Cachón 
2002:113).  
The change in the level of acceptability of the Spanish population was 
connected to the massive profile change of the domestic population. With an increase 
of 369% of the active population with university studies from 1987 to 2001, the 
available pool in the secondary labor market has decreased significantly (Cornelius 
1994:342). Notwithstanding the concentration of immigrants in certain sectors, their 
presence even in these ones is relatively modest. In either way, statistics show that 
immigrants are mostly employed in the jobs defined by the three Ds: dirty, dangerous 
and demanding (Cachón 2002:120-121).  
The Spanish Constitution gives the central state the exclusive competence in 
managing immigration flows, while the Autonomous Communities and local 
communities are responsible for certain services within employment, health, housing 
and education, all of which are expected to concern the integration of the immigrant 
population (Miret 2009:53). However, this does not mean that there is a neat 
differentiation between the central state as responsible for admission concerns, while 
the integration is decentralized to the regional and local levels.  
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The Spanish law on asylum was up until its reform in 1994 a rather generous 
one, as it gave ampler rights than what is mentioned in the international Geneva 
Convention of 1951 (Ospina 2008:319). In this reform, the rapid denegation of 
obviously fraudulent asylum application was specified. When an application is denied, 
the solicitant has the obligation to leave the country within fifteen days. In 2006, only 
7.8 % of the asylum applications in Spain were accepted (Ospina 2008: 320). Because 
of the relative overshadowing of the asylum issue in Spain by the irregularity aspect, 
the asylum regime will not be discussed thoroughly in this thesis. 
4.2.3 The Regularization Processes 
The immigration law of 1985 prescribed very few details and thus left much leverage 
to the executive arm to take the measures the government in office saw fit in a policy 
field that was far from developed (Calavita 1998:545). This led to a kind of ‘muddling 
through’ approach to immigration policy in Spain during a long time, where concrete 
policies were worked out with administrative regulations. This has permitted various 
regularization processes in Spanish immigration history, which as noted means that 
irregular immigrants may apply for residence and work permits. The first 
regularization process was formally called the Secondary Transitory Disposition in the 
immigration law, which gave undocumented immigrants who were already working in 
Spain the possibility to regulate their situation. Over the nine months that this 
possibility lasted, 43 815 applications for regularization were handed in (Ospina 2008: 
315). Anyway, within three years only twenty percent of the Moroccans who were 
included in the first regularization process had successfully renewed their work 
permits, which were dependent on having a formal contract of employment. This 
unfortunate situation, which Casey denominates ‘de-legalization’ was the first example 
of regularized immigrants later finding themselves without the proper documents 
(Casey 2010 [Telephone-interview]).    
In 1990, the socialist government presented, at the request of Parliament, a 
communiqué explaining the basic lines of Spanish policy on immigration (Cachón 
2009:170). The communiqué was important as it acknowledged that the country was 
67 
 
facing a phenomenon that would change some of the traits of the Spanish nation. 
Following the arguments of the communiqué, Parliament approved a government 
proposition concerning foreigners in Spain. This proposition included a series of 
administrative reforms, as the creation of the General Directorate of Foreigners within 
the Ministry of Interior. Further, the Foreigners’ Office started its work in 1991, the 
Interministerial Commission on Foreigners was created in 1992 and the Forum for 
Social Integration of Immigrants was created in 1995. Altogether this indicated a more 
active stance of the Spanish government on immigration. In addition, immigrants who 
had ongoing work contracts, were self-employed in a “lucrative, legitimate enterprise”, 
or had previously had a valid residence and who could prove that they were already 
Spain by the 15th of May 1991, could apply for regularization. The aim was to rectify 
the errors that had lead to that only a small amount of immigrants were long-term 
regularized in the regularization process of 1985-1986 (Cornelius 1994: 354). In this 
way, the government tried to take action against the earlier mentioned de-legalization.  
Another key piece of the change of direction in immigration policy was the 
establishment of the first annual quota system for authorizations to foreign workers in 
1993. The formal goal of this instrument was to canalize and control immigration. In 
practice however, the result was more a concealed annual regularization proceeding, as 
virtually all authorizations were granted to immigrants already residing and working 
illegally in Spain. In addition, because of administrative hurdles, only about one fourth 
of the 20 000 slots provided were filled. In 1994 the strict regulations concerning the 
quotas were loosened and this system remains an integral part of Spain´s immigration 
policy. In 2007 for instance, 180 034 non-communitarian workers were contracted 
through this system (Ospina 2008:348). 
A third regularization process was launched as a consequence of the Royal 
decree 245/1996, approved by Parliament in February 1996 shortly before the general 
elections. This time it was denominated ‘documentation of foreigners’, as it targeted 
immigrants who at one stage had been legal after the first of January 1986. The 
approved decree also intended to mend some of the instability that immigrant workers 
were facing. The new regulation provided a fresh system for work permits, which 
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included a permanent permit for work and residency that could be obtained after living 
legally for five years in Spain (Cachón 2009:171).  
Even if the regularizations present a pragmatic solution to the problematic 
situation where important quantities of irregular immigrants reside on national 
territory, they are inherently linked to a dilemma. Simultaneously, they generate the 
assumption amongst irregular immigrants that their status will soon be regularized 
anyhow, so there will no longer be an incentive for going through the procedures for 
legal entry (CES 2004:137-138).  
4.2.4 Stricter Immigration Policy with the Foreign Law Reforms in 
2000 
The first reform of the Spanish Foreign Law took place in the year 2000, at the end of 
José María Aznar´s rightist Partido Popular government´s first term. This reform was 
the culmination of a process which started with a Royal Decree of 1996, where some 
of the stricter aspects of the immigration law of 1985 were toned down. The law 
promised important evolutions regarding border control and the permanence of 
foreigners in the country. However, changes were minor in both the regulation and in 
the control of the migratory flows (Ospina 2008:321). The priority of the law was to 
make sure that “foreigners in Spain will enjoy the same equality of conditions as 
Spaniards” (cited in Ospina 2008: 321, author´s translation). The inclusive tone of the 
reform was mainly caused by the fact that the PP did not have absolute majority in 
Congress, and therefore ended up with a much more lenient law than it wanted. This 
was partly a result of the influence of the Catalan nationalist party, CiU, which the PP 
was dependent on. According to Ospina, a fundamental characteristic of the first 
reform of the Spanish foreign law in 2000 was the consensus between the political and 
social forces which were involved in its approbation (Ospina 2008:322). This law was 
criticized for de facto encouraging illegal immigration, as clandestine immigrants 
gained access to health and education, and certain political rights such as union 
membership.  
After the general elections in Spain in 2000, when the PP did win the absolute 
majority, the foreign law was yet again reformed on the 22nd of December. In its 
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preamble, the motivation of approximating the European Union´s communitarian 
norms was explicitly mentioned. The major characteristic of this reform was its main 
focus on control aspects, based on well described sanctions. For example, sanctions 
against transport companies that bring illegal immigrants to Spain were introduced. In 
addition, the principle of expulsion of illegal immigrants was reactivated, and the 
consequences for employers of illegal immigrants were mentioned as well (Ospina 
2007:330-331). The new legislation also removed the rights of irregular migrants to 
union membership, the right to association, to demonstrate and to strike (Geddes 
2003:168).  In this way, the PP of José María Aznar was able to shape the reformed 
immigration law in a way that it had not succeeded in doing when it relied on the 
support of the Catalan nationalist party, as was the case before the elections.  In 
addition, in these first years of the 2000s, most of the ministerial competence on 
immigration issues was concentrated within the Ministry of the Interior (Pinyol 
Jiménez 2009:272).  
In the Spanish labor market on the other hand, the phase from 2000 to 2004 was 
marked by the continuous expansion of sectors and posts which resort to immigrants to 
answer the demand of labor, particularly the submerged economy (Saliba 2010 
[Telephone interview]). This happened despite the formal ‘zero immigration’ policy of 
the PP government.  
In 2003, the PP government introduced a bill which included in its title “citizen 
security, domestic violence and social integration of immigrants” (Cachón 2009:172, 
author´s translation). In this bill it was not as much the substance that was 
controversial, but that the title linked crime to immigration. It should also be noted that 
this bill was passed only one week before local elections in Spain.  
4.2.5 The Impact of the Zapatero Socialist Government from 2004 
After the general elections of 2004, the socialist PSOE government with José Luís 
Rodriguez Zapatero as its President1
                                                 
1 Although Spain is a constitutional monarchy, the head of government is denominated President instead of 
Prime Minister (CIA).  
 came to power. This signified a shift in focus of 
immigration policy, at least during a certain period, from border control towards 
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coordination with labor integration. Even if the Spanish Immigration Law did not 
change during Zapatero´s first government from 2004 to 2008, the positive aspects of 
immigration, for example in economic terms, were underscored (Saliba 2010 
[Telephone interview]). According to Cachón, this change in policy has included the 
acknowledgement of immigrant´s rights, an active integration policy, effective 
management of immigration flows, and most importantly in this study, the creation of 
a laboralized immigration policy (Cachón 2009 [Interview]).  
4.2.6 The CES Report: A New Philosophy on Immigration Policy 
A central force in the shaping of the current laboralized immigration policy turned out 
to be the trade unions CCOO and CGT. The trade unions first presented their 
proposition for change to employers´ confederations in the Economic and Social 
Council (CES in Spanish abbreviation), even before the general elections of 2004. This 
particular institution, which has existed since 1991, is a consultative organ for the 
Spanish government and is composed of both syndicates and employers´ organizations 
(CES 1991). The CES has the right to take the initiative to propose policy changes to 
the government and this is exactly what it did when the parties worked out a common 
document concerning changes in immigration policy. According to Cachón, this 
document is to be seen as the basic political philosophy of the new regulations, which 
allows foreign workers to enter legally in Spain (Cachón 2009 [Interview]). The CES 
report which was presented to the government in 2004 underscored the necessity of a 
kind of system that could effectively connect foreigners who are willing to migrate to 
Spain in order to work, and the potential employers demanding their labor (Cachón 
2009:178). 
  As the syndicates evaluated the situation, the existing systems of work permits 
and the annual quotas needed important improvements to obtain a functioning system 
for legal entry to work in Spain (CES 2004:129-130). Further, an improved system 
would have to take into account the presence of large quantities of irregular 
immigrants. The efforts of the government should, according to the CES report, be 
focused on clear and simple procedures, flexibility in processing and permanent 
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contact with employers. Secondly, the administration of the work permit system would 
have to be simplified and unified in order to gain efficiency and credibility, while 
guaranteeing both the rights of workers and the demands of employers.  
The CES report also validated that the quota system was functioning in a more 
appropriate way after the reforms of 2000 and 2001, in that the quotas were now 
referring to actual vacant posts, and not as a concealed regularization (CES 2004:131). 
However, the syndicates asserted that this kind of system by nature could not respond 
efficiently to the demands of the labor market, while also guaranteeing workers´ rights. 
In addition, a solution for irregular immigrants was also proposed in the report. This 
included a development called regularization through “arraigo”, which expressed 
regularization on individual basis (CES 2004:138-139).  
4.2.7 From Philosophy to Regulation Changes 
Consuelo Rumí, the new Secretary of State of Immigration, expressed the will of 
reform when she appeared in Congress in June 2004, to explain her socialist 
government´s immigration policy. Here, she expressed that the policy field would be 
prioritized in the legislature, and that a new policy would be formed through 
compromise with the Autonomous Communities, municipalities, trade unions, 
businesses and non-governmental organizations, as well as other political forces. She 
justified this will to reach a broad compromise by the conviction that the immigration 
phenomenon had such an importance for the coexistence in Spanish society that any 
unnecessary confrontations should be avoided (Rumí 2004). Consuelo Rumí admitted 
that the results of the management of legal labor immigration to Spain up until the 
moment had been very unsatisfactory. The reason for trying to mend this situation, 
Rumí said, was that effective canals for legal immigration was the single best 
disincentive for would be irregular immigrants for embarking upon a dangerous 
journey only to achieve a marginalized undocumented existence. She also judged 
unsustainable the present situation where the majority of the more than one million 
immigrants who were working legally in Spain at the moment, by default had to go 
through a phase of irregularity. This is why the government wanted to discard the 
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possibilities of further regularization processes, as they ended up becoming factors of 
attraction for potential irregular immigrants. A physical manifestation of a new focus 
on immigration, was that Rumí, moved her offices from the policing-oriented Ministry 
of Interior to the Ministry of Labor (Pabón-López 2007:18-19).  
As a consequence, an elaborate system of legal entry for work immigrants was 
put in place. Contrary to the earlier quota systems, the new regime provides a much 
more realistic possibility for legal entry for work immigration, for example 500 000 
people arrived legally to work in Spain in 2008 (Cachón 2009 [Interview]). To a large 
extent, this system represents the implementation of the changes proposed in the CES 
report.  
In the new regulation of the immigration law of 2004, the requisites for 
foreigners who wish to live and work in Spain are established. In fact, this regulation 
opened another regularization process, denominated the Normalization. This process, 
which is intended to be the final regularization, applied for irregular immigrants who 
were working in the country, and who had a job contract with the duration for at least 
six months, who had lived in Spain for at least six months and who did not have a 
criminal record.  When the process closed, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
declared that 573 270 of the 688 419 applications had been approved (Ospina 
2008:347).  
Spain was criticized by other Member States in the EU, as the normalization 
would have consequences on the whole of the Schengen Area. But Spain appears to 
legalistically be in its right to conduct the process, as the transfer of power on 
immigration policy is not complete. The fact that immigrants were only granted 
temporary work permits as a result of the process, means that they would not have the 
normal freedom of movement in the EU (Pabón López 2007:29). As the normalization 
happened during an economically prosperous period, the immediate economic gains 
were massive, not least because of the 8 billion € contributed by the regularized 
immigrants in taxes (Pabón López 2007:31). But as the normalization has a limited 




The new regulation also included an individual regularization procedure in 
accordance with the “arraigo” principle. “Arraigo” means roots, and is thus 
figuratively referring to immigrants who have taken roots in Spain. The regularization 
through the “arraigo” principle first appeared with the reforms of Spanish immigration 
law in 2000. The inspiration of this principle was found in comparative law that 
established resorts for irregular immigrants who could present exceptional 
circumstances that would weigh heavily against expulsion. At the same time as 
resolving the situation for these irregulars, the individual “arraigo” principle means 
that the government does not have to resort to the kind of massive regularizations 
which are described earlier (Cachón 2009:197). The PP government of Aznar had 
attempted to limit the conceding of “arraigo” regularizations through another reform in 
2003. However, as this reform did not include any substantial content, Zapatero´s 
PSOE government was able to assign new meaning to the law (Cachón 2009:198). In 
the current system, an irregular immigrant may apply for labor “arraigo” 
regularization, “arraigo” regularization for family reasons or social “arraigo” 
regularization.  The PP is still vehemently opposed to the arrangement. The PP speech 
person on immigration policy, Rafael Hernando calls it “a devilish system where a 
person may arrive illegally, then stay in the country for three years, and then obtain the 
papers” (cited in Partido Popular 2010, author´s translation). 
In addition to the above mentioned changes in regulations, the government  
sanctioned the EU directive on the right of family reunification, as well as the directive 
on the rights of third country nationals living in the EU (Cachón 2009:174). At the 
same time, the central government approved several Autonomy Statuses that 
transferred the competence of administering work permits to the Autonomous 
Communities. Catalonia started, as the first Autonomous Community, to administer 
work permits the 1st of October 2009 (Saliba 2010 [Telephone interview]). This shows 
that the central state is not anymore necessarily the only relevant unit when studying 
immigration policy, including even the admission aspects of it.  
Even if the main impression of these processes suggests a softer approach to 
immigration, the fight against clandestine immigration remained an objective of 
Zapatero´s leftist government. The State Secretary of Immigration, Consuelo Rumí, 
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legitimized this position with the argument “without legality, integration cannot exist” 
(Rumí 2004, author´s translation). When Consuelo Rumí explained the government´s 
immigration policy, she stressed that this was one of the strategic goals of the 
government, and that the new government had every intention of standing firm in the 
fight against irregular immigration. The measures the government would resort to were 
sanctions against transport companies, the increase of expulsions, as well as better 
readmission treaties with countries of origin. The government saw these readmission 
treaties as an indispensable effort in Spain´s immigration policy. In addition, it was 
proposed to expand the readmission treaties to include countries like Ghana, Cape 
Verde and Guinea-Conakry, in addition to the countries with which treaties already 
existed (Rumí 2004). The main motivation for these countries to agree on the treaties 
was to become eligible for the new contracting system of workers in their countries of 
origin (Santolaya 2009:85).  
4.2.8 The Boat Immigrant Crisis  
During the year of 2005, to the satisfaction of the Spanish government, the arrival of 
illegal immigrants in boats to Spanish territory diminished, as the number of detainees 
decreased from 10 042 in 2004 to 6 361 in 2005, according to Consuelo Rumí. An 
important factor to reach this goal, she argued, was the cooperation with Morocco to 
control illegal immigration (Ospina 2008:349-350). However, this led to a massing of 
irregular migrants in Morocco, which in turn resulted in various dramatic episodes, 
particularly near the Spanish enclave Melilla. In addition, as the route which illegal 
immigrants earlier took from Morocco over the Gibraltar Strait was effectively shut, 
immigrants were diverted to trying to cross from Senegal and Mauritania towards the 
Spanish Canary Islands (Ospina 2008:351). Only between January and August of 
2006, nearly 20 000 African boat migrants reached the archipelago, which was an 
unprecedented level. Even though the percentage of immigrants entering Spain as boat 
immigrants has been low, this phenomenon was given very much attention by both 
Spanish media and politicians. It was informed by the government that Spain was 
trying to curb the inflow of illegal immigrants through accords with the governments 
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of the countries of origin, combined with effective vigilance of the maritime migratory 
routes.  
The migration flow towards the Canary Islands is in fact very small compared 
to the total immigration in Spain, and does not even represent 5 % of the total inflow 
each year (Cachón and Laparra 2009: 28). Up until 2006 the major part of immigration 
was irregular, but this was normally done with much less dangerous modes of 
transportation like planes, cars or buses. It could also consist of simply overstaying a 
visa. As a migration policy problem, the inflow of African migrants is therefore not 
important. Limiting the number of persons trying the dangerous journey, and in that 
way reducing humanitarian cost in the form of human lives, however, is an important 
issue. Still, the dramatic images have contributed to the perception of the general 
Spanish population that nearly all immigrants are illegal (Cachón and Laparra 
2009:28).  
4.2.9 A Changing Model for Immigration: Emerging possibilities of 
Legal Entry 
In either way, the boat immigrant crisis showed that the traditional Spanish model for 
immigration the last decade, which has been based on irregularity as an important 
element, has had its limitations. In turn, this led to poor control by the public 
administration because of little experience and few institutional and administrational 
mechanisms related to the planning, regulation and management of the migratory 
flows. The main reason for the persistence of irregularity has been the characteristics 
of the Spanish labor market which offers job opportunities even when one does not 
hold a work and residency permit. In a way, the informal economy and irregular 
employment lock immigration in irregularity, and thus the room for forging a coherent 
immigration policy is limited for Spanish decision makers (Cachón and Laparra 
2009:30).  
This model of irregularity now seems to fit a little less precisely to the situation 
on the ground in Spain. For example, the share of formal work has been increasing 
steadily since the mid nineties. In addition, the introduction of new regulatory tools for 
managing the immigration flows has been contributing to this development. Amongst 
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these tools is the possibility for foreign workers to obtain authorizations for staying 
and working in Spain through being contracted by Spanish firms in their countries of 
origin. Additionally, the possibility of flexible employment for those who apply for 
this kind of authorizations, the possibility for irregular immigrants to obtain residence 
authorization through the “arraigo” principle or family reunification are included.  
To reach the new mixed system of realistic possibilities of legal entry, 
combined with readmission treaties with countries of origin, the history of Spanish 
immigration management has different periods: From the general immigration 
regulations, that has been impossible to practice, via the false quota system and the 
real but scarcely utilized quota system between 2000 and 2004 (Cachón 2009:178). An 
additional aspect from 2005 onwards is the possibility of immigration through family 
reunification. Even if this formally is not equivalent to work immigration, it has 
become an important route of entry in the Spanish labor market, since these 
immigrants are eligible for obtaining work permits in Spain.  
4.2.10 Economic Crisis and Immigration Policy 
The financial crisis since 2008 has certainly had its effects on specific sectors where 
foreign workers are concentrated, like in construction. This might reduce the 
attractiveness of the Spanish labor market for potential immigrants. It also risks that 
parts of the economy answer to the crisis by again submerging into the informal 
economy, with a strengthening of the tendency to contract irregular immigrants 
(Cachón and Laparra 2009:30-31).  
In at least the short term, immigration has had important implications in a 
positive way for both the economic development and for the sustainability of the 
Spanish welfare state. The regularization processes in 2005 alone led to the emerging 
of nearly 600 000 clandestine workers, who afterwards contributed an estimated 1, 5 
billion € in taxes in the fiscal year of 2006. In the years between 2001 and 2006 an 
estimated 50 % of the increase of the BNP could be attributed immigration, according 
to the Presidential Economic Office (Cachón and Laparra 2009:35). 
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In the second term of Zapatero´s PSOE government from 2008, the name of the 
Ministry of Labor was renamed the Ministry of Labor and Immigration (Cachón 
2009:175). Notwithstanding, the structure State Secretariat of Immigration has 
remained the same as before.  However, the direction of Spanish immigration policy 
seems to have taken yet another turn during the last years. As is well established, the 
country now traverses one of its worst economic crises of history. According to 
Ghassan Saliba, the immigrations secretary of the labor union Comisiones Obreras in 
Catalonia, the PSOE government has reacted to the economic crisis by taking a more 
restrictive stance when it comes to immigration policy (Saliba 2010 [Telephone 
interview]). It is further asserted by Saliba that the inclusive discourse of the PSOE 
was significantly changed in 2008 with the arrival of a new minister of Labor and 
Immigration, Celestino Corbacho. The latest reform of the immigration law, which 
was passed in November 2009, represented a significant tightening of policy. This 
included an expansion of the internment of irregular immigrants from 40 to 60 days. In 
addition, the reform limited the right of family reunification for immigrants residing 















In the analysis chapter, I will employ the perspectives of organizational theory to 
explain the major characteristics of the Spanish immigration policy field. The 
respective theoretical perspectives will focus on the empirical aspects that they are best 
suited to explain.  This is why the theoretical perspectives not always offer competing 
interpretations of the same empirical evolutions.   
5.1 The Instrumental Perspective 
In this section, central aspects of the Spanish immigration field will be explained with 
the basis of the instrumental perspective. Firstly, it will be explained how the different 
organizational approaches to immigration policy reflect the goals of the varying 
political parties in government. Secondly, the important regularization processes in 
Spanish immigration history will be interpreted as a quasi-solution of political conflict. 
Lastly, the specific specialization principles of European immigration policy 
cooperation will be explained on the basis of the coalition variant of the instrumental 
perspective.   
5.1.1 Competing Principles of Horizontal and Vertical Specialization 
As immigration to a country increases over time and the public agencies concerned 
with immigration affairs employ more persons, it is expected that the formal 
instructions and procedures will be made more explicit.  Because of the severe 
administrative incapacities on immigration, it could be argued that the formalization of 
the Spanish immigration policy field has not kept up with the increasing demands for 
organizational solutions.  
The differing approaches to immigration policy which have been followed on 
the immigration policy field by the varying governments in Spain may reflect the 
discretionary power of the political leadership, which is asserted in the instrumental 
perspective. In the instrumental perspective, the political-administrative structure is 
first and foremost a tool for the political leaders which serve to achieve goals. It is 
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argued, the formal structure of the immigration policy field has to a low degree been 
inhibiting when the political leadership in Spain has decided the strategy. The 
instrumental perspective would interpret changes in policy as a change in the 
perception of means/goals analysis of the political leaders. It is hardly surprising that 
the rivaling Spanish political parties do not share the same perceptions of problems 
and solutions on the immigration policy field. But significant policy changes have 
taken place even when the same government has stayed in power for consecutive 
legislatures. For instance, the current minister of labor and immigration, Celestino 
Corbacho, has taken a stricter position on immigration issues than his predecessor 
from the same party. 
The reactive approaches of Spanish leaders on the immigration policy field can 
hardly be said to represent an instrumental planning of the future. However, the 
organization of the field has to a certain extent reflected the focus of the governments 
in office. In Spain, the specialization and coordination principles of the immigration 
policy field have somewhat varied. But it is argued that the main tension in regard to 
horizontal specialization has been between a security oriented and a labor oriented 
approach. During the years of government of the Partido Popular, the security 
approach was dominating, as immigration issues were mostly organized within the 
Ministry of the Interior.  However, from 2004, a centralized model containing a 
coordinating agency of all matters related to immigration within the Ministry of Labor 
was chosen during the first PSOE government of Zapatero. In this way, it was very 
clearly stated by the PSOE government that immigration was to be treated primarily as 
a concern of the labor market. Accordingly, this move indicated a horizontal 
centralization of the immigration field, as both matters of admission and integration 
were gathered within the same ministry. Further, the rebranding of the Ministry of 
Labor to the Ministry of Labor and Immigration in 2008 might also be interpreted as 
the desire of a more holistic approach to the policy field. This current model is 
combining a system for legal work immigration adapted to the needs of the Spanish 
economy, while it is supposed to guarantee efficient expulsion of irregulars. The 
system that allows for contracting immigrant workers in their countries of origin 
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testifies that organizational changes make a difference, despite major problems with an 
irregularity rate that has continued to be elevated.   
Further, it is claimed that the reorganizations of 2004 also represented an 
element of vertical coordination, motivated by the desire for stronger political control. 
This was secured, as the State Secretariat of Immigration and Emigration was placed 
within the Ministry of Labor.  In this way, the professional autonomy and decreased 
political control, which the instrumental perspective regards as a consequence of 
vertical specialization, was avoided (Egeberg 1999:158). This is because the 
instrumental perspective affirms that vertical specialization tends to increase 
professional autonomy and decrease political control. In this way, it is improbable that 
the State Secretariat starts to shape policy, in contradiction to the wishes of the 
government. It is underscored, the organization model of a secretariat instead of a 
more independent agency, reflects the prioritizing of control over autonomy of the 
immigration policy field. Accordingly, coordination and political control seems to 
have been dominant concerns by the current PSOE government at the national level. 
Notwithstanding, vertical specialization of the executive branch at the national level is 
not the only type of power devolution possible. Indeed, decentralization of competence 
to the autonomous regions has taken place simultaneously as the coordination efforts 
at the national level.    
When it comes to the decentralization of competence to issue work permits to 
autonomous Catalonia, it can be interpreted as running contrary to the coordination 
attempts of the socialist party PSOE on the policy field. It is true that as the 
Autonomous Communities already possessed various competences on the integration 
aspects of immigration, it might only be reasonable that they also handle work permits. 
However, the possibility for the Spanish government to coordinate the inflows of 
immigrants on a national level, might be challenged as Catalonia is the Spanish region 
that traditionally has been most affected by immigration.   
The impression of a tendency towards a more centralized and coordinated 
organization of the immigration policy field in Spain is therefore somewhat disturbed 
by the devolution of competency to some of the Autonomous Communities. From a 
strictly hierarchical instrumental perspective, it might seem odd to follow two 
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seemingly counteracting principles at the same time. But in real life, reforms with 
elements of both centralization and decentralization at the same time have been rather 
normal in public management reforms in western countries (Christensen et al 
2004:37). It could be asserted that the solution reflects the idea that the setting of the 
frames and procedures of the labor immigration system is being kept at the central 
state level, included a strengthening of organizational capabilities, which was 
embodied with the establishment of the State Secretariat. At the same time, deciding 
the amounts of immigrants needed is delegated to the Autonomous Communities 
which experience the largest immigration pressures. Further, this may reflect the desire 
of national politicians to lead in general lines, while delegating daily management to 
the regional level. On the other hand, deciding the amount of permits for immigrant 
workers is certainly no triviality, but challenges the exclusive competence of the 
nation state to determine who may enter the territory legally.  
It is further important to acknowledge the relevance of the coalition variant of 
the instrumental perspective when it comes to analyzing this decentralization of 
competence: The PSOE government is relying politically on powerful groups which 
strongly favor devolution to the regional level, namely the CCOO union and the 
moderate Catalan nationalist party CiU. It could therefore be argued that this specific 
aspect of the reorganizations led by the PSOE government is a compromise with their 
political partners. 
5.1.2 The Regularization Processes as Quasi-Solutions of Conflict 
It is argued that the regularization processes of irregular immigrants which have taken 
place in Spain contain elements of quasi-solutions of conflict, in accordance with the 
coalition variant of the instrumental perspective. By not vouching for either very strict 
enforcement of immigration regulations or a lenient official policy, several problems 
are being postponed. The first option might have settled the fundamental challenge of 
irregular immigration in Spain once and for all. However, it would have been 
extremely costly. This would include direct costs related to police operations of the 
forced expulsion of irregular immigrants. Further, indirect costs in the form of reduced 
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revenues for employers who contract irregular immigrants in their businesses, would 
have had to be included in the equation. As a result, this is a compelling argument not 
to carry out officially strict immigration policy. The alternative of a significantly 
liberalized immigration policy would on the other hand be hazardous, politically 
speaking.  The compromise of maintaining the strict laws on immigration while at the 
same time granting a temporal amnesty for irregular immigrants, has therefore been 
chosen at various instances of the evolution of Spanish immigration history. In the 
short term, the regularizations may have eased social tensions by issuing documents 
for irregular immigrants who thereby can leave behind a marginalized clandestine 
existence. As has been mentioned, the government benefits from immediate gains, as 
regularized immigrants equal tax-paying immigrants. In addition, as Spain has been 
characterized by important quantities of irregular immigration, the very process of 
achieving proper residence and work permits might be seen as a crucial first step of the 
integration of immigrants into society. Notwithstanding these immediate positive 
consequences of the regularization processes, they make it increasingly difficult to 
deter would be irregular immigrants from entering the country. This is because 
potential clandestine immigrants may get the impression that they can just as well 
enter Spain, as they expect to be regularized eventually.   
5.1.3 Specialization Principles at the European Level 
At the European level, the instrumental perspective may explain the outcome of the 
cooperation on immigration. It has been argued that the immigration phenomenon has 
been criminalized, partly as a result of the organization principles on immigration 
policy of the European Union. In this study, it is argued that a security oriented 
purpose specialization principle has been dominant in the European Union, as 
communitarian immigration concerns have been organized under the Justice and Home 
Affaires Pillar. The issues defined as being of common interest have mainly included 
external border control, converging asylum policies, as well as the fight against 
irregular immigration. It is further argued that this specialization has had significant 
effects on how the immigration phenomenon is perceived at the communitarian level. 
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By involving primarily the interior ministries in the interstate cooperation, 
immigration has come to be regarded as a law and order problem.  
  However, immigration policy is composed of both regulation of migration 
flows and the integration of immigrants in the receiving societies. The omission of 
creating common policy on integration of immigrants in the European Union can be 
interpreted as a non-decision based on the coalition variant of the instrumental 
perspective. Individual Member States have been dependent on increasing 
coordination on the admission aspects of immigration policy, particularly as the 
Schengen treaty has meant the abolition of internal borders in the zone. However, the 
lack of interest in creating a common European integration policy by the Member 
States may be explained by the challenge this would pose for the prerogatives of 
national governments on fundamental state-society relations. The trade-off with 
increased efficiency, which remains an important argument for cooperation on the 
admission aspects, does not seem to be of significance on the integration field. In this 
way, the coalition of individual Member States who refuse to give up ownership on 
integration policy is a dominant one, while the supranational institutions are being 
excluded. 
5.2 The Cultural Perspective 
When analyzing the Spanish immigration policy field with the cultural perspective, the 
particular institutional context of the Spanish economy will be assessed. In the next 
turn, the path-dependency and increasing returns theories will be employed to explain 
the dynamics of irregular immigration in Spain. Next, the logic of appropriateness and 
ambiguity of appropriateness variants of the cultural perspective will be employed in 
turn to interpret the outcomes of two interconnected processes, namely the contracting 
system of 2004 and the last normalization of irregular immigrants. At last, the 
transformative change theory will be used to explain how incremental changes have 
led to significant outcomes on the immigration policy field both in Spain, and in 
cooperation within the European Union.  
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5.2.1 The Spanish Immigration Policy Field in a Unique Institutional 
Context 
The volatility of the Spanish immigration policy field can be said to reflect the low 
degree of vertical institutionalization of the policy field. As the different agencies 
concerned with immigration have been organizationally dispersed up until 2004, it 
seems improbable that a specific organizational culture has developed within the 
administrative agencies concerned with immigration. At least, there is little evidence 
of values and informal norms that have developed organically as a result of handling 
immigration issues. In addition, as the immigration policy field emerged in the 1980s, 
Spain did not have any predating experience with the phenomenon and only a few 
institutionalized rules on the field. In this way, political leaders and institutional actors 
had to try to manage immigration policy without any relevant precedents. According 
to the cultural perspective, this means that administrative organizations concerned with 
immigration do not seem to have become institutionalized. When following the logic 
of appropriateness, it is no surprise that the rule of law has not been taken for granted 
in this kind of situation (March and Olsen 2006:8).   
However, it is argued that traits of the Spanish political culture in general have 
had significant effects on the outcomes of immigration policy. Because of the 
institutionalized ties in Spain between business and governments, regardless of their 
political color, seriously pursuing employers who hire irregular immigrants is judged 
to be difficult (Cornelius 1994:348).  In this way, control of employers has been 
avoided, while external border control has been increasingly prioritized during the 
period. This shows how the unique culture of a country influences outcomes on a 
policy field. According to the culture perspective, political leaders, who are 
institutional members of the same system, are severely restrained by the informal 
institutional rules of the political culture. 
 The horizontal institutionalization of the immigration policy field in Spain 
seems to be significant. Immigration to Spain, which has been dominantly 
characterized by irregular work immigration, is tightly linked to other important field 
of Spanish society. By providing central sectors of the economy with cheap labor, the 
immigration system marked by a large degree of irregularity is associated with heavy 
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economic interests. Consequently, the system has important domestic stake holders 
who draw benefits from the cheap labor which irregular immigrants provide. It is 
argued that this creates different incentive mechanisms to maintain the current system, 
than in countries where immigration takes the form of asylum seeking, which provides 
less immediate economic gains for the destination countries´ economies. Accordingly, 
immigration concerns are not isolated from the economy, but possess significant 
horizontal linkages to other spheres of Spanish society. By enforcing the strict 
immigration regulations on the internal labor market, the sectors which employ 
irregular immigrants would suffer.  As a result, this has not happened. It is therefore 
argued that the informal rules of the Spanish economy have been able to trump the 
formalized rules and laws on immigration.  
In this way, institutionalization of the Spanish economy as a whole has 
significantly affected the evolution on the Spanish immigration field. The agrarian, 
construction and service sectors, which have been the motors of the Spanish economy,   
have been dependent on access to unqualified labor at low costs. To a great extent, the 
country´s large and diversified underground economy, which has become more and 
more dependent on immigrants as Spaniards are less inclined to accept the types of 
jobs offered in it, has provided the mainstream economy with this labor (Cachón and 
Laparra 2009:30). This means that the institutionalized informal practices in the 
Spanish economy have shaped the Spanish immigration system. It is therefore difficult 
to explain the general irregularities in the Spanish economy without resorting to the 
cultural perspective, as this is the perspective that highlights the informal aspects of 
institutions.  A peculiarity of Spanish culture, namely the tradition for hiring off the 
books in the Spanish economy, has probably affected the acceptability of irregular 
immigration as well. It can be argued that this tradition from the outset created a 
specific path of the Spanish immigration system, as it facilitated the possibility for 
immigrants to obtain employment without having the formally necessary permit. 





5.2.2 Path-Dependency and Increasing Returns 
The path-dependency and increasing returns theories give importance to the historical 
context which a phenomenon emerges in. In order to perform this temporal oriented 
analysis, important societal evolutions preceding the emergence of the Spanish 
immigration system are examined.  In this way, it is argued that the economic crisis in 
the 1970s was an important factor of explanation for the particularities of the Spanish 
immigration system. As a result of this crisis, the labor system of the country was 
deeply segmented, where there is still a sharp distinction between fixed contracts and 
temporal contracts. Indirectly this segmentation shaped the profile of the immigration 
to the country, as the tradition for hiring off the books became widespread. It is argued 
that preceding events shaped the immigration phenomenon which only started to gain 
importance over a decade later (Cornelius 1994:343). This economic crisis is therefore 
interpreted as a critical juncture which has determined the posterior evolution of the 
Spanish immigration system. This is because a secondary job market in demand of 
irregular labor was already in place when immigrants started to arrive in larger 
numbers. Due to the timing, later efforts of Spanish politicians to direct immigration 
towards functioning legal channels have not had the desired effects because of the 
concentrated increasing returns of the persisting irregularity. 
Even if important actors in Spanish society have gained economically, there 
does not seem to be much evidence that the evolution of the Spanish immigration 
system first came about as a result of coordinated moves with this motivation. The 
locking in of an institutional path may originate from factors which are not purely 
functional (Pierson 2000:264).    
In the next turn, employers who took advantage of the cheap labor that the 
unqualified irregular immigrants provided, specialized their businesses to labor 
intensive production, and therefore acquired vested interests in the system. In this way, 
a locked in path-dependent pattern was crystallized. As the Spanish economy 
expanded throughout the nineties, other options for managing immigrant inflows and 
also restructuring of the Spanish economy were associated with a significantly higher 
relative cost. Consequently, it is asserted that the continuing tolerance of irregularity in 
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the Spanish economy, to the benefit of some segments of it, has led to power 
asymmetries that are very difficult to reverse, as a consequence of dynamics of 
increasing returns. Over a substantial period of time, the processes of positive 
feedback have benefitted the construction and service sectors in Spain in a way that 
have made political debate and conflict concerning the basic economic arrangements 
highly unlikely (Pierson 2000:257).   
The economic crisis that Spain is going through at the moment has to a large 
extent been seriously aggravated by the reliance on the labor intensive service and 
constructions sectors. These are as mentioned the sectors where irregular immigrants 
tend to be concentrated. Furthermore, these sectors are typically very sensitive to 
economic growth cycles. The cyclical evolution is conventional economical 
knowledge and it should have been possible for Spanish politicians to reorient the 
national economy. At least, this would have been the interpretation of a more rational 
instrumental perspective. By taking advantage of the human capital of the Spanish 
population there might have been prospects of restructuring the economy to a more 
knowledge intensive one. But the immediate costs, including political ones, attached to 
such a restructuring are expectedly very high. This short term cost of institutional 
changes reinforces the dynamics of increasing returns. The alternatives which present 
the lowest costs in the short term are consistently chosen. In addition, the significant 
incomes created by the economic take-off in Spain up until the current crisis, may 
have contributed to the postponing of a possible restructuring. In this way, the 
economy has continued to be dependent on irregular immigrants. As Pierson 
underscores, politicians are motivated more by gains in the short term than in the 
longer term (Pierson 2000:261). 
This shows another insight of the cultural perspective that underscores the 
importance of the institutional framework: Governments come and go, but the basic 
dynamics of the Spanish economy have remained. Even if a new government arrives in 
office with relatively correct perceptions of the major problems that society faces and 
specifically within the immigration policy field, it will not have the power to change 
these institutionalized dynamics. Irregularity is an important factor in the Spanish 
economy, which it had been for a long time before immigration emerged as political 
89 
 
issue. Clearly, formal rules have not been enough to stem this institutionalized 
irregularity as there is no apparent lack of legislation concerning the economy in Spain 
either. Further, the institutional capacity of control does seem to be very limited. This 
seems to be particularly the case once irregular immigrants have succeeded in reaching 
the Spanish territory, as border control is prioritized higher than internal control in 
places of employment.  
5.2.3  The Logic of Appropriateness in Immigration Policy Decision 
Making 
It is possible to interpret the process preceding the rearrangements which led to the 
new system for contracting workers in their countries of origin, by employing the logic 
of appropriateness. The Economic and Social Council (CES) does have the right to 
propose changes in policy for the government in office. However, only the meeting 
points are formalized, as there is no obligation for the government to follow the 
advices of the council. All the same, in 2004, the PSOE government actually 
implemented the majority of central proposals from the CES report which is called the 
political philosophy of the changes of regulation. This shows that not only formal 
rights of decision are relevant when policies are analyzed. As a minister of a partly 
corporatist state, it can be appropriate to take into consideration advice from the labor 
unions and the employers´ organization. As the CES report of 2004 represented the 
coordinated view of these organizations, it was particularly appropriate to introduce 
the contracting system. The power of the logic of appropriateness does not seem to be 
too strong though, as the role of the CES has been significant only during the 
governments of the PSOE, which has been more explicitly including other social 
forces. During the rule of the PP from 1996 to 2004, the CES seems to have had very 
little influence over immigration policy. In either way, the CES is visibly valued by the 
members from the labor unions, as it at least provides an obligatory meeting point 
between parties of the labor system and the government: “They don´t have to listen to 
us, but at least the Spanish Constitution obliges the government to meet us in the CES” 
(Saliba 2010 [Telephone interview], author´s translation).  
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In addition, the different possible modes of accounting present in the logic of 
appropriateness may shed light on the regularization processes. Granting regularization 
for illegal immigrants might be accounted for either on the basis of consequences or on 
the basis of appropriateness. The regularizations of irregular immigrants in Spain 
might clearly have been inappropriate in some ways, as it is a kind of reward for 
people who are not acting in accordance with the law. But the argument of estimated 
positive consequences seems to have prevailed.   
5.2.4 The Absence of Formal Regulations Leaves Room for Informal 
Values 
It is possible to interpret the relationship between the regularization processes in Spain 
and the European Union´s reactions from the alternative ambiguity of appropriateness 
approach of the cultural perspective. Spain has had to conform to formal European 
rules, including rules concerning immigration policy. But in the case of the 
regularizations, it is argued that there was a lack of formal rules against them. As 
explicit formal rules concerning the regularizations of irregular immigrants in the 
common European immigration policy were not present, Spain had the possibility to 
go ahead with the regularizations. In this particular situation, the outcries from more 
powerful partner countries preceding the large regularization process in 2005 were not 
sufficient to deter the Spanish government from implementing them. In this way, the 
absence of formal prohibition of regularizations in the communitarian agreements left 
a room for informal values to have effects. The informal values of the unions and 
employers´ organizations, based on labor class solidarity and loyal competition, can 
therefore have constituted a significant factor, when these institutions in the first 
instance laid pressure on the newly elected PSOE government.   
5.2.5 Transformative Change 
How institutional actors interpret and take advantage of the existing rules is an 
interesting aspect which is emphasized in the transformative change theory of the 
cultural perspective. It is highly doubtful that Spanish politicians who passed the first 
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immigration law in 1985 were aware of its consequences, as the country was not yet 
experiencing any significant immigration. The majority of the fundamental principles 
of the immigration law of 1985 have survived the different reforms which have taken 
place on the policy field. Still, it is argued that different governments have been able to 
make incremental changes of policy within the basic framework, which have 
amounted to significant outcomes. The most important incremental change on the 
policy field seems to be the political non-decision to tolerate a steadily increasing 
number of irregular immigrants. At a certain point, the number of irregular immigrants 
have risen to a number so high that the premises for shaping immigration policy are 
unrecognizable, compared to the situation when the first immigration law was passed.  
A more active effort to attach new meaning to an institutional rule took place 
when the PSOE government in 2004 introduced the system of individual “arraigo” 
regularizations (Cachón 2009:198). The principle of “arraigo” was in fact theoretically 
introduced by the rightist PP government, as part of an amendment to the immigration 
law in 2003. However, the object at the time was to rule out the possibility for further 
regularizations altogether. It is not plausible that leading actors in the PP government 
knew that the regulation they introduced would be manipulated by the PSOE, once in 
power, to effectively introduce the individually based “arraigo” regularizations. In this 
way, elements of existing arrangements were removed, while others were added, as it 
is asserted in the transformative change theory of the cultural perspective.  
The transformative change theory may also provide a complementary 
explanation of the security focus of common immigration policy at the European level. 
It could be argued that the horizontal specialization of immigration concerns under the 
Justice and Home Affairs Pillar represents a form of transformative change through 
layering. There has been a growing focus on border control, while other aspects as 
integration policy and member countries´ market structures have been omitted (Geddes 
2003:163). The initial focus on external border control seems to have benefitted from 
differentiated growth, as each new initiative on immigration incrementally has resulted 
in a strong security emphasis. In this way, the outcome of a law and order focused 
immigration policy cooperation is not primarily understood as the result of coordinated 
cooperation between equal partner countries. Instead, it is argued that some of the 
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Member States have managed to impose their security oriented solutions on the 
immigration policy field incrementally. The requirements imposed on new Member 
States to conform to strict immigration policies seem to have contributed to the 
evolution.   
5.3 The Myth Perspective 
In this section, the instrumental perspective will be contrasted by an interpretation 
which asserts that formal reorganizations mainly function as symbolic statements. 
Further, it will be explained how the rhetoric and the actions of Spanish politicians 
have been decoupled, in accordance with the myth perspective. The deterministic 
ideational power of myths will be illustrated by analyzing the recent shift towards 
stricter immigration policies in Spain. In addition, it will be analyzed how the 
European Union functions as the dominant entity in the institutional environment in 
relation to the Spanish immigration policy field. Ultimately, the interpretations of 
important aspects of Spanish immigration policy field by the virus theory approach, 
will dispute the ones made by the conventional myth perspective.      
5.3.1 Symbolic Use of Formal Reorganizations 
Opposed to the instrumental perspective, the myth perspective seriously questions the 
effects of formal structure. It is therefore important to present the interpretation of the 
myth perspective of the organizational changes. Firstly, the various relocations of 
competence of immigration concerns do not seem to have changed the basic dynamics 
of the Spanish immigration system. It is conceded that they reflect the ideological 
understanding of the immigration phenomenon by the two major parties. But it is 
argued here that the reorganizations mainly represent the desire of the governments in 
office to make symbolic statements of their priorities of immigration policy. In very 
general terms, the Partido Popular (PP) has sought to reaffirm their position as the law 
and order party by signaling a security focus, as immigration concerns were 
specialized within the Ministry of Interior during its two terms from 1996 to 2004. On 
the other hand, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) coordinated all 
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immigration concerns under the Ministry of Labor in 2004, “in a move calculated to 
appear welcoming to the immigrants” (Pabón López 2007:18). Accordingly, what is 
emphasized is the symbolism of these actions, which does not reflect their 
effectiveness.  
 The security focus of the PP, which also included formally very strict laws on 
immigration, did not seem to in any way stem the irregular immigration to Spain. In 
fact, it is argued that the submerged economy expanded greatly from 2000 to 2004, 
during the second term of the PP. As a consequence, irregular immigration increased 
in this period. Because of the distance between the stated goals of official policy and 
the practical reality, it is argued that this is an example of ceremonial accounting of 
official policy.  
However, it may be argued that the laboralized approach of the PSOE 
represents just another rationalized myth in Spanish immigration policy. Regardless of 
political party, the goal to efficiently canalizing the immigration flows into a 
functioning system of legal immigration has been more or less focused. This goal 
might be said to reflect the overly optimistic view of formal structure in modern 
society, which is underscored in the myth perspective. In this sense, the goal is 
interpreted as a rationalized myth. The contracting in countries of origins is probably 
not enough to put an end to irregular economic activities by immigrant workers and 
domestic employers. However, by emphasizing the program, socialist politicians are 
able to boast of having a proactive policy on work immigration. In the same way as in 
the case of the security approach of the PP, the PSOE is performing ceremonial 
accounting of their laboralized approach. 
What seems to be the common ground between the two dominating parties is 
the belief that strongly communicating their intent to strictly persecute irregular 
immigration policy actually put off would be immigrants from the idea of leaving their 
home countries in the third world. For instance the central argument of the newly 
elected PSOE government in 2004 was “without legality, integration is not possible” 
(Rumí 2004, author´s translation). This may be interpreted as attempts to use 
symbolism in order to obtain the goal of reducing the inflow of immigration, i.e. 
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consciously taking advantage of myths. Still, it is argued here that the credibility of 
these statements is doubtful.   
5.3.2 Decoupling of Rhetoric and Actions on the Spanish 
Immigration Policy Field 
It is argued that the dispute of the relative importance of the calling effect and the 
pushing effect has been a central prerequisite for the general debate concerning the 
dynamics of migration. The calling effect means the symbolic messages which might 
induce third world residents to attempt to migrate to certain western countries. The 
pushing effects on the other hand, include the elements which force the same people to 
leave their home countries (Zapata-Barrero 2008:129). In order to prevent further 
illegal immigration from third world countries, Spanish politicians are attempting not 
to make statements that may provoke calling effects. One of these attempts has 
consisted of stating that no more mass regularization processes will take place in 
Spain. However, there seems to be evidence of decoupling concerning these 
statements, mainly because of the sheer number of regularized immigrants during the 
past two decades. When nearly 600 000 irregular immigrants obtained work and 
residence permits during the normalization process of 2005, it is argued that the 
guarantees against further mass regularizations might not have the desired effects. In 
addition, the possibility for individual “arraigo” regularization still exists. It must 
therefore be assumed that the symbolic messages stating no tolerance for irregularity 
are less than credible; Spanish politicians´ actions have not corresponded with their 
statements concerning this issue.     
As a part of the efforts to deter irregular immigration, formal readmission 
treaties have been put in place with many countries of origin. However, there are 
strong indications that this measure is mainly vindicated as a symbolic gesture. It is 
underscored that it is a scarcely used measure in reality, particularly for immigrants 
from farther countries of origin. For instance, Bolivians represent the most important 
community of irregular immigrants in Spain. As one single expulsion of a Bolivian 
irregular immigrant costs between 5000 and 6000 €, this naturally poses serious 
problems for Spanish public budget. Therefore, it is suspected that expulsions do not 
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represent a prioritized solution in practice. Instead, it is proposed that this measure 
should be interpreted as a decoupling of formal structure and actual practice.   
5.3.3 “There Is no Alternative”: Toughness on Immigration 
In the contemporary political climate in Europe, it seems as the only viable 
solution for parties is to signal the desire for tougher measures in order to stem 
immigration. More or less rightist parties have gained significant support from election 
groups which earlier would have voted for traditional labor parties to the left. Even 
leftist parties, the Spanish PSOE included, have adopted similar rhetoric on 
immigration policy as the populist parties to the right on immigration issues. In this 
way, the toughness myth has gained so much ideational power in the institutional 
environment that political leaders believe that “there is no alternative” (Christensen 
and Lægreid 2008:12-13). This shows the strong deterministic potential of myths in 
the institutional environment. The main motivation for adopting this position is mainly 
to halt electoral leakages to the right. But there might not be too many reasons for 
immigration hostile voters to choose a centre-left party anyway. It seems as the 
discourse of the general immigration policy debate is being carried out on the 
populists´ premises. It could be claimed that this evolution illustrates the ideational 
power of rationalized myths in modern society. For a number of reasons, putting in 
place as many obstacles as possible for entering and staying in developed countries for 
immigrants from the third world has come to be the dominating idea. When ideas 
become dominating in the institutional environment, it is very hard to resist them, and 
institutional actors are compelled to, at least superficially, adopt them. Contradictory 
ideas on immigration policy are commonly discarded as representing a naïve approach. 
Parties which are not communicating tough enough visions for immigration policy risk 
performing poorly in elections.  
That possibilities for contracting irregular immigrants have survived, regardless 
of the official policy of the government in office, strongly indicates that the toughness 
myth is a really a myth in the Spanish case. In practice, tougher formal measures might 
not have large effects. In this way, the instrumental view of the change of direction in 
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Spanish immigration policy is challenged, as the restrictions may not reflect a change 
in goals/means perceptions in the PSOE. Instead, it is proposed that the change 
towards more restrictions from 2008, are more the result of pressures from the 
institutional environment. It is therefore proposed that the formal strict policy is and 
has been decoupled from practice on the immigration field. The myth perspective 
asserts that this decoupling permits Spain to adjust activities to its need, i.e., tolerating 
irregularity because of the demand of labor. On the other hand, it enables the ruling 
party to “maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures” which are required by 
the institutional environment (Meyer and Rowan 1991:58). The motivation for 
signaling a tougher stance on immigration is therefore interpreted as a response to the 
institutional environment, and not as a premeditated instrumental adjustment of policy.  
5.3.4 The European Union Composing the Institutional Environment 
of the Spanish Immigration Policy Field 
The very limited results of the reorganizations and rebranding of Spanish immigration 
policy make the myth perspective explanation plausible, as they have seemed to have a 
larger communicative value than real effects on irregularity. For instance, the boat 
immigrant crisis of 2006 was generally perceived as an affirmation of the importance 
of physical border control when fighting irregular immigration. This includes patrols 
of the ocean between the Canary Islands and the African coast, sophisticated sensors 
and cooperation with the sending states of boat immigrants. In many ways, these are 
valid solutions, as the crossing attempts factually were on the rise during this period, 
which also led to big losses of human lives. Nevertheless, the reaction in the media 
and in the general public in Europe that accused the Spanish state of losing its capacity 
to effectively control its borders and thereby guaranteeing the nation´s survival, seem 
to have been even more significant for the answer of the Spanish government. This 
indicates that the crisis was first and foremost a crisis of legitimacy of the Spanish 
state in relation to the institutional environment. By applying all the measures 
mentioned above, which are taken for granted as rational by both Spanish voters, by 
the European Union and by other Member States, the government sent a symbolic 
message that it was on top of the situation. However, that the measures are taken for 
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granted as rational does not mean that they actually have an impact on the numbers of 
irregular immigrants in Spain; it is likely that they are rationalized myths. Independent 
of the efficacy of procedures defined by rationalized concepts of organizational work, 
Spain had to incorporate them in order to guard the state´s legitimacy (Meyer and 
Rowan 1991:41). By acting in accordance to the expectations of the institutional 
environment, further scrutiny of the Spanish immigration system was avoided.  
Indeed, the waves of boat immigrants to the Canary Islands have decreased 
dramatically since the crisis of 2006. But as has been underscored earlier in this study, 
only a very small proportion of immigrants who have entered Spain are boat 
immigrants, and this was true even during the crisis. The mentioned measures can 
therefore logically not have large effects on the total amount of irregular immigration 
to the country. In this way, the argument that the solutions represent rationalized 
myths is strengthened. However, the socially constructed reality does not have to 
accurately reflect objective facts like this. Accordingly, the boat immigrant problem 
has been defined as the most important concern in Spanish immigration policy. Stated 
concerns for the safety of the boat immigrants do not seem particularly convincing, as 
the most common way of describing the arrivals was by employing threatening 
connotations like “invasion” or “avalanche” (Ospina 2008:357, author´s translation). 
As the crisis has passed, and Spain has succeeded to stem the boat immigration, with 
financial and logistical aid from the European Union, the country is able to show in 
ceremonial inspections that it is pursuing rationalized immigration control policies.   
It can be argued that this represents a clear example of a difference between 
what happens on the front stage, and what happens on the back stage, as it is described 
in the myth perspective. The boat immigrant crisis was very visible, and therefore on 
the front stage of European politics and media, which made it extremely important for 
Spanish politicians to do something about it. As noted, the immense majority of 
irregular immigrants enter Spain by normal means of transport. But as these entries 
take place back stage it is not as relevant for institutional actors. By applying 
rationalized solutions to the boat immigrant problem on the front stage, Spain displays 
significant ceremonial conformity. In this way, the Spanish government has been able 
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to avoid further losses of legitimacy without having obtained much in actually 
persecuting irregular immigration in itself.     
An important explanation of the influence of the European Union on the 
Spanish immigration policy field lies in the power of the institutional environment. 
Firstly, the very strict immigration law of 1985 is hard to understand from a purely 
instrumental approach, as Spain did not at the time experience any significant 
immigration. It could possibly be stated that this strictness was an expression of 
proactive thinking amongst Spanish politicians who wanted a harsh immigration law 
from the outset. However, this study has, partly as expected, not been able to reveal 
evidence of such instrumental planning by Spanish leaders before the passing of the 
immigration law 1985. In addition, if Spanish politicians were to act rationally and 
foreseeing at this stage, it does not seem logical to pass a law that would make it 
virtually impossible for employers in the expanding Spanish economy to legally 
contract foreign unskilled labor. Explaining this law with a myth perspective approach 
therefore seems strengthened, especially as studies have shown that the European 
Union is a very powerful provider of rationalized myths (Christensen et al 2004:73). 
When it comes to prestigious ideas, the power-relation between Spain and the 
European Community at the time may in addition have contributed to the Spanish 
acceptance of European standards on the immigration policy field from the outset. 
After all, it is best to behave in accordance to the norms when one is aspiring to join an 
exclusive club. The entry of Spain into the union was to be the ultimate certification of 
the country as a modern, democratic and dynamic state, and the culmination of the 
democratization process that started nearly a decade earlier. The prospect of obtaining 
such a prestigious evaluation assessment was probably more attractive than the 
possibility of shaping a comprehensive and independent immigration policy. Again, 
immigration was not even a particular challenge at the time.  
Further, there is high confidence in formal organization in temporary society 
(Meyer and Rowan 1991:44). In the case of Spain entering the European Union, this 
has meant that the formal adaptation of the Spanish immigration law induced trust of 
Spain not becoming a hole in the European immigration fence (Ospina 2008:313). But 
that this formal organization often takes the form of myths, which are not dependent 
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on outcomes, is seldom as clearly visible as in the case of establishing a formally strict 
immigration policy in Spain from 1985 onwards. It seems as Spain accepted the 
communitarian norms for immigration policy apparently based on their face value, as 
they were legitimized by the most important myth producer in Spain´s institutional 
environment, the European Union. Applying such a standardized approach to 
immigration can be regarded as a tendency towards institutional isomorphism (Powell 
and DiMaggio 1991:66).   
 Modern organizations, which include nation-states, are also sensitive to and 
employ external ceremonial criteria of worth, in order to legitimate themselves in the 
environment and demonstrate socially their organizational fitness. When it comes to 
European common immigration policy, it is argued that the most important external 
assessment criterion is the admittance of a country into the Schengen Area, as this is 
treated by the institutional environment as proof of the firm border control in the 
candidate country. In this way, being a formally accepted Member State in the 
Schengen Area guarantees on some aspects against serious questioning of a country´s 
immigration policy. It is argued here that as long as Spain has not violated the formal 
prerequisites of the Schengen Treaty, the country´s immigration system has not been 
the object of serious external assessments.  
The partner countries of Spain in the European Union have not until very 
recently criticized the Spanish labor market system, which is a more significant reason 
for the irregular immigration to Spain than loose border controls. From a myth 
perspective, it may be argued that the negligence of evaluating the Spanish economy 
as a producer of irregularity is related to the significant economic growth, which Spain 
experienced simultaneously as the increase in irregular immigration. Economic growth 
is one of the most powerful rationalized myths in western society (Christensen and 
Røvik 1999:16). Therefore, the economic growth of Spain may have served as a proof 
for the institutional environment that everything was in order with all relevant aspects 
of the national economy. Irregular immigration has been a moderate but significant 
contributor to the sectors which have driven this Spanish economic take-off. 
Consequently, posing questions about the premises for economic growth, which is 
uniformly appraised as a virtue in the institutional environment, has not taken place. 
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When it comes to the criticism of the economies of Spain and other countries of 
Southern Europe as the financial crisis currently unfolds, it is interesting to observe 
how the persisting irregularities of these economies suddenly are regarded as 
fundamental problems. Conjoined with the rationalized security approaches of 
immigration policy, the economic growth myth has probably contributed to the 
external border control focus of Spanish immigration policy.       
5.3.5 Immigration Policy Myths as Viruses and Instrumental 
Manipulation of the Institutional Environment 
In opposition to the assumption of decoupling asserted in the classical myth 
perspective above, the effects of the toughness on immigration myth are not dismissed 
from the outset in an interpretation according to the virus theory. As it is underscored 
in the alternative version of the myth perspective, myths might function like viruses, 
which need a certain time of incubation before an eventual outbreak (Røvik 
2007:349).It is possible to track use of anti-immigration rhetoric in national Spanish 
politics to the campaign preceding the general elections of 2000, when the Partido 
Popular was the first party to emphasize the need for significantly tougher immigration 
policy. As this discourse has become increasingly dominant in Spanish society, both 
the general public and other political parties have been influenced by it. As it is 
expressed in the virus theory of the alternative myth perspective; they have been 
contaminated. In addition, it might be suspected that this particular myth is being 
exploited by the government to divert the public from more deep-seated problems as 
the condition of the national economy. But in this view, the apparent reactionary turn 
on immigration in Spanish politics is not just a question of conforming ceremonially to 
demands of the institutional environment. Instead, it is proposed that the harsher 
rhetoric has actually had an influence on realities on the ground. Even if the 
repatriation treaties mentioned are scarcely used, the PSOE government has also 
introduced other retrenchment measures in the immigration law reform of 2009, like 
restraining the right of family reunion, and prolonging the internment period for 
apprehended irregular immigrants. It is argued that these measures have very real 
effects on the daily lives of immigrants. This is even true for legal immigrants, as the 
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possibility for living with their families is diminished. However, it is argued that these 
effects possibly serve as substitutes for a superior goal. What still may be doubted is 
whether these measures actually will have effects in deterring would be irregular 
immigrants from entering Spain. 
In addition, it is possible to interpret the shift in immigration discourse as an 
expression of Spanish politicians who have come to regard the communitarian 
European goals of immigration policy as their own. This might be a result of the 
virulent potential of rationalized myths. Further, Spain is also actively pushing the 
European Union to take responsibility of the external Spanish border control and to 
provide a larger part of necessary finances and logistics (De la Vega 2006). Moreover, 
the Spanish PSOE government has been attempting to export its laboralized 
approaches of immigration flow management to the European Union. The goal of this 
is to achieve communitarian agreements for work permits and readmission treaties 
with third countries, similar to the bilateral agreements which Spain has struck. 
Accordingly, it is affirmed that myth dynamics represent a two way relationship.  In 
this way, it may be argued that Spanish leaders are able to manipulate the myths to 
their advantage, as it is asserted in Røvik´s alternative elaboration of the myth 













6.1 Main Findings 
The most important challenge in Spanish immigration policy has throughout the 
period from 1985 up until today been the fight against irregular immigration. It has 
been argued that the particular dynamics of the Spanish economy to a certain degree 
have shaped the country´s immigration system. In the agrarian, construction and 
service sectors, abundant demands for unskilled labor have in many ways trumped the 
formally strict border control measures and visa regulations. These have probably 
based their continuing presence on the relative ease of finding irregular work, the 
general tolerance of their presence and the hope of future regularization processes. 
Accordingly, the increased immigration has coincided with a prolonged period of 
expansion in the Spanish economy. Two main approaches have been applied to meet 
this basic challenge: The security approach and the labor approach.  
The security approach includes measures as border control, visa regulations, 
internment and expulsion of irregular immigrants, and readmission treaties with 
countries of origin and transit. From the outset, this approach seems to have been the 
dominant one, as the immigration law of 1985 marked the strict exclusion of any 
foreigners that did not hold the valid permits to stay or to work in Spain. As Spain at 
the time did not experience much immigration, the intention of the law was seemingly 
to accommodate the future partners in the European Community, which Spain entered 
the following year.  
In the labor approach of immigration policy, a recurring objective for Spanish 
politicians, regardless of political color, has been to invent functioning systems for 
legal work immigration. In this approach, it is assessed that the most efficient way to 
fight irregular immigration is providing realistic possibilities for legal work 
immigration. The labor approach seems to have had a nascent period from 2004 
onwards, when a functioning system for contracting workers in their countries of 
origin was materialized. However, the functioning of this particular system is difficult 
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to judge as Spain in the meantime has entered a catastrophic economic recession, 
which has limited the list of occupations in demand of labor.   
Various regularizations have been put in place in order to reduce the number of 
irregular immigrants living and working in Spain. As eligible immigrants necessarily 
have traversed periods of irregularity, this specific solution must be said to reflect a 
severely restricted ability amongst Spanish legislators to foresee and implement 
measures to halt irregular immigration before it grows out of control.  The fact that 
several such processes have taken place strengthens the impression of reactive, rather 
than proactive politicians. Further, other measures, like the annual quota system for 
foreign workers to enter legally to work in Spain, also functioned for a long time in 
this reactive manner. This is because nearly all immigrants who were selected in the 
program already lived irregularly in Spain. The central dilemma of the regularization 
processes is that they clearly oppose short term goals to longer term goals in 
immigration policy. As an advantage, they have eased social pressure and, as large 
groups of undocumented persons might introduce a general feeling of insecurity in 
society, while irregular immigrants themselves have to lead unfavorable clandestine 
lives. In addition, the regularizations include an obvious economic incentive for 
Spanish governments, whereas regularized immigrants mean tax-paying immigrants. 
The problem is that with each regularization process, the vow of it being the last of its 
kind grows less credible. In this way, the longer term immigration policy goal of 
showing a firm attitude in the fight against irregular immigration is undermined.  
The impression of the immigrant admission policy as an exclusive domain of 
the central government is ruptured by more recent devolutions of competence from the 
state towards the autonomous communities. Catalonia has been the first autonomous 
community which has obtained the competence to issue work permits, which is a 
central aspect of admission policy. The case of devolution to Catalonia might 
potentially signify an evolution towards decreasing central coordination on the policy 
field if the system will be expanded to other Autonomous Communities as well.      
 Winning coalitions of Spanish immigration policy have varied, from the ones 
favoring a liberal policy to the ones favoring more restrictions and tighter control. The 
rightist PP has been consistent in its reactionary stance. However, it has been unable or 
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unwilling to seriously implement its tough stance, as the growth of irregularity 
increased during its reign from 1996 to 2004. The take-off of the Spanish economy at 
the time probably induced further irregular immigration, as demands for unskilled 
labor boomed. What the PP government achieved in economic growth, might in turn 
have undermined what the same party perceives as a central subgoal, namely strict and 
efficient border control.  
 The socialist PSOE has seemingly had a more double faced approach, whereas 
it is the government party that was the first to succeed in creating a potentially 
successful system for legally contracting third country nationals. The process leading 
to this reform was visibly a result of a winning coalition within the Economic and 
Social Council (CES). Here, both the labor unions and the employers´ organizations 
were able to invest in their common interests on immigration policy. Together with a 
general sentiment that favored the labor-oriented side in the PSOE in that something 
had to be done with the foundations of the immigration system, it was possible to go 
through with the new regulation. On the other hand, readmission treaties for irregular 
immigrants with the countries that were to be eligible for the contracting system were 
imposed simultaneously. Consequently, this shows a certain compromise between 
different camps within the PSOE.  
In addition, the economic crisis seems to have skewed the balance of power 
within the PSOE. The party has pursued a tougher stance on immigration than earlier, 
especially since the arrival in office of the current minister of Labor and Immigration 
Celestino Corbacho 2008. However, it is difficult to assess if this shift in the power of 
definition on immigration in the ruling PSOE is to be treated as a populist answer to 
the current economic crisis. As an alternative, it might be a part of the general trend of 
an evolution in the approach to the immigration policy that has been visible amongst 
centre left parties throughout Europe. The most interesting aspect of this strategy is 
that these parties have adopted the rhetoric and practice that was earlier the exclusive 
domain of populist parties of the right. Critical voices though, underscore the risk in 
pursuing this strategy and assert that “immigration hostile voters won´t vote for the 
PSOE when they can vote for the original, the PP” (Saliba 2010 [telephone interview], 
author´s translation).   
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 As the case of the passing of the first immigration law revealed, the European 
Union has exerted considerable external pressure when it comes to delimiting the 
options available for Spanish politicians on the immigration policy field. It has been 
affirmed that the European Union has been the most important myth producer in the 
institutional environment of the Spanish immigration policy field. However, Spain has 
been able to take advantage of loopholes of the country´s formal immigration 
cooperation commitments. For instance, the regularization processes which have taken 
place in Spain clearly ran counter to the wishes of Spain´s partners in the EU.  
6.2 Theoretical Implications 
To a large extent, the above section sums up the answer to the first part of this study´s 
research question, which was what are the changes in the Spanish immigration policy 
and in the administrative organization of the policy field since 1985 up until today?  In 
this section, the answer to the second part of the research question will be given. This 
was how well do the three perspectives from organizational theory account for these 
changes? 
It is concluded, no single one perspective of organizational theory has been able 
to account for all of the aspects of the Spanish immigration policy field. It is argued 
that this study has strengthened the position which asserts that the perspectives of 
organizational theory are best regarded as complementary approaches. By combining 
them, it has been possible to shed light on different aspects of Spanish immigration 
policy. The instrumental perspective was useful in explaining official policy and 
changes of formal structure. But it has not been able to explain the persisting 
irregularities in the immigration system in Spain. Instead, the cultural perspective has 
captured the essence of these aspects. Here, the immigration policy field has been 
studied in light of the institutionalized informalities of the Spanish economy and labor 
market. Finally, the myth perspective has been crucial for revealing the great 
importance which Spain has attributed to the demands of the institutional environment. 
This might have to do with the particularities of the immigration phenomenon; the 
reasons for international migration are not easily influenced by national politicians in 
receiving countries. At the same time, the politics of immigration are often laden with 
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symbols. In combination, these elements create a demand for rationalized solutions. 
Further it has been showed that the European Union is a dominating provider of these 
solutions on the Spanish immigration policy field. Finally, it is concluded that this 
study has showed possibilities for institutional actors, as an individual country, may 
influence the institutional environment, in this case the European Union. Altogether, 
this indicates that the perspectives of organizational theory are suitable for studying 
complex policy fields.  
Spain certainly faces very serious problems at the moment in relation to the 
national economy. If the large irregular immigration has been a symptom of an 
inflexible and ill adjusted economy, a better functioning immigration system in the 
future might serve as an indicator that the country is finally adjusting to a more 
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